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Despite the organizational benefits of treating employees fairly, both anecdotal and 
empirical evidence suggest that managers do not behave fairly towards their employees in 
a consistent manner. As treating employees fairly takes up personal resources such as 
time, effort, and attention, I argue that when managers face high workloads (i.e., high 
amounts of work and time pressure), they are unable to devote such personal resources to 
effectively meet both core technical task requirements and treat employees fairly. I 
propose that in general, managers tend to view their core technical task performance as 
more important than being fair in their dealings with employees; as a result, when faced 
with high workloads, they tend to prioritize the former at the expense of the latter. I also 
propose that managerial fairness will suffer more as a result of heightened workloads 
than will core technical task performance, unless managers perceive their organization to 
explicitly reward fair treatment of employees. I find support for my hypotheses across 
three studies: two experimental studies (with online participants and students 
  
respectively) and one field study of managers from a variety of organizations. I discuss 
the implications of studying fairness in the wider context of managers’ complex role in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
“Everyone knows that being fair costs little and pays off handsomely. Then why 
do so few executives manage to behave fairly, even though most want to?” 
(Brockner, 2006) 
Managers play a key role in shaping employees’ perceptions of fair treatment 
(Fassina, Jones, & Uggerslev, 2008; Rupp, Shao, Jones, & Liao, 2014). Ensuring that 
employees are treated fairly seems like a worthwhile investment of managers’ time, 
attention, and effort. After all, employees who feel fairly treated are more committed, 
perform better, engage in more citizenship behaviors (e.g., helping), behave less 
counterproductively (e.g., stealing on the job), and are less likely to leave their jobs 
(Colquitt et al., 2013). Why then, as Brockner (2006) asks in the quote above, would a 
rational manager not treat his or her employees fairly? 
Employees are more likely to feel fairly treated when managers’ actions adhere to 
the rules of justice: equitable allocation of outcomes, provision of influence over 
decisions and lack of decision bias, candid communication of justifications for decisions, 
and respectful treatment in everyday interactions (Adams, 1965; Bies & Moag, 1986; 
Leventhal, 1980). Yet, observing these rules (e.g., asking for input, explaining decisions, 
diligently reviewing all pertinent information before making employee related decisions, 
and phrasing communications respectfully) requires investing personal resources such as 
time, attention, and effort (Brockner, Wiesenfeld, & Diekmann, 2009; Johnson, Lanaj, & 
Barnes, 2014), resources that are in limited supply in work settings (Bergeron, 2007; 
Quinn, Spreitzer, & Lam, 2012). Therefore, in this dissertation, I propose that treating 




invested in fair treatment cannot be invested in meeting core technical task 
responsibilities (e.g., meeting with clients, studying market reports, ensuring smooth 
operations) which similarly require time, attention, and effort (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & 
MacDermid, 2005). To the extent that managers are reluctant to harm their core technical 
performance, they might rationally choose not to adhere to rules of justice in dealing with 
employees.   
The opportunity costs of treating employees fairly are especially salient when 
managers face high workloads (i.e., high amounts of work and time pressure; Ilies, Huth, 
Ryan, & Dimotakis, 2015), that is, when they perceive their limited personal resources as 
insufficient to meet all their job requirements. For example, will a manager spend his/her 
limited time and energy listening to an employee’s concerns about a promotion decision 
or completing an urgent report for the boss? Will s/he spend an afternoon reading 
employee performance reports to ensure that an upcoming performance evaluation is 
accurate and meaningful to employees or reviewing market data for a product launch 
decision due soon? Current theories about why and when managers’ behaviors adhere to 
rules of justice do not provide answers to these questions as they do not account for the 
possible effects of managers’ broader work responsibilities on their fair treatment of 
employees (cf., Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Siegel, Bobocel, & Liu, 2015; Scott, Colquitt, & 
Paddock, 2009). Given that managers often face high workloads (Campbell, Bates, 
Marin, & Meddings, 2007; Lovelace, Manz, & Alves, 2007), they are often forced to 
prioritize between completing their core technical task responsibilities effectively on the 
one hand and engaging in behaviors that contribute to perceptions of fair treatment on the 




behaviors that foster perceptions of fair treatment can explain why fairness, despite its 
benefits, is not as common as expected. 
Resource allocation theory suggests that when people face multiple tasks and 
believe that they cannot complete all of them successfully, they prioritize between these 
tasks based on their outcome expectancies – i.e., they allocate more personal resources to 
the tasks that they expect will enable them to achieve valued and desirable outcomes 
(DeShon & Gillespie, 2005; Hockey, 1997; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). I argue that 
managers are likely to believe that investing personal resources in fulfilling core technical 
responsibilities will more probably result in desired outcomes (e.g., bonuses, promotions, 
recognition), as compared to investing these resources in justice rule adherence. This is 
because of two related reasons. First, there is a general preference to overvalue the 
completion of core technical responsibilities over employee treatment. That is, although 
managers often view fairness as important (Greenberg, 1990a; Meindl, 1989), in 
achievement oriented settings such as the workplace, the promotion and attainment of 
specific and measurable organizational goals is seen by people as more valuable and 
important (cf., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Second, this general preference is usually 
strengthened by the way organizations evaluate and reward managerial performance. 
That is, rewards in organizations are frequently tied more strongly to managers’ technical 
performance as opposed to how they treat their employees (Brockner et al., 2009). As a 
result, I propose that justice rule adherence (as compared to core technical performance) 
will be deprioritized and therefore, be more negatively affected by managers’ workload. 
However, when organizations explicitly reward managers on fair treatment of employees 




managers’ prioritization decisions are likely to be more balanced and less biased towards 
core technical performance. Therefore, in such cases, fair treatment is less likely to be as 
negatively affected by workload. My arguments are visually summarized in Figure 1.  
This paper thus makes three theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the 
growing literature on fairness as a dependent variable (i.e., why and when do managers 
treat employees (un)fairly; Brockner et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2009). This literature has 
mostly focused on justice rule adherence in isolation, exploring whether it is predicted by 
managerial and employee characteristics (e.g., Mayer, Nishii, Schneider, & Goldstein, 
2007; Scott, Garza, Conlon, & Kim, 2014; Zapata, Olsen, & Martins, 2013), but without 
considering how such adherence is affected by other responsibilities that compete for 
managers’ personal resources. As a result, our knowledge of the antecedents of fairness is 
artificially restricted to situations where managers’ personal resources are adequate to 
meet all their work responsibilities, which is often not the case. My theorizing highlights 
how managers’ workload can play an important role in shaping employees’ perceptions 
of fairness by affecting managers’ decision to prioritize their other responsibilities over 
adherence to rules of justice. 
 Second, this paper contributes to research on the role of organizational factors in 
shaping fairness perceptions (Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000; Schminke, 
Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002). This literature has devoted little attention to managerial 
evaluations and rewards despite their likely effects on managerial behavior (cf., Bowen & 
Ostroff, 2004). This paper highlights how managerial rewards affect fairness by changing 
managers’ prioritization decisions. This focus on organizational factors such as 




characteristics or individual differences that are more stable, it points to more feasible 
levers that organizations can utilize to improve perceived fairness, that do not require 
changes in managerial selection.  
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on work demands (e.g., workload; 
Bakker, Demerouti, & Sanz-Vergel, 2014). This literature has mostly explored the 
implications of managerial demands on performance without taking into account the 
multifaceted nature of performance (cf., Courtright, Colbert, & Choi, 2014; Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). Managers are frequently expected to fulfill multiple roles 
(Mintzberg, 1973; Yukl, 2012) and thus understanding the tradeoffs they make in the face 
of demanding environments is core to improving organizational effectiveness (Conway, 
1999). This paper thus advances knowledge on the differential effects that work demands 
have on multiple aspects of managers’ performance and sheds light on how and why 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
 
 
Managers’ Core Technical Tasks and Justice Tasks   
Effective performance in organizations is multifaceted (Northcraft, Schmidt, & Ashford, 
2011; Whiting, Podsakoff, & Pierce, 2008). Managers are expected to engage in multiple 
behaviors such as solving problems, making decisions, and allocating resources (cf., 
Janssen, 2001; Mintzberg, 1973). In line with theories of leadership (House, 1996; Katz 
& Khan, 1978; Seifert, Yukl, & McDonald, 2003; Yukl, 2008) and taxonomies of 
managerial performance (Borman & Brush, 1993; Conway, 1999; Oh & Berry, 2009), I 
focus on two broad categories of managerial tasks: (a) core technical tasks and (b) 
relational tasks. 
First, managers are expected to engage in core technical tasks. Core technical 
tasks “bear a direct relation to the organization's technical core, either by executing its 
technical processes or by maintaining and servicing its technical requirements” 
(Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994, p. 476). For example, managers are frequently 
expected to ensure that their work units reach their goals and produce desired and 
expected organizational outcomes, report to their superiors, make technical decisions 
(e.g., which product to develop, what market to expand into), interact with clients or 
external stakeholders, and implement new initiatives (Conway, 1999; Yukl, 2008, 2012). 
Second, managers are expected to engage in relational tasks, that is, to “manage” or 




of human resources and relations” (Yukl, 2012, p. 68) and to maintain the satisfaction 
and motivation of employees (Conway, 1999). Relational tasks include making personnel 
decisions about employees, evaluating and assessing them, allocating resources among 
them, providing recognition for achievements and contributions, consulting with them 
about decisions that will affect them, and providing them with information (Borman & 
Brush, 1993; Yukl, 2008). It is important to note here that although, core technical tasks 
and relational tasks are conceptually distinct are, they are not mutually exclusive and 
might co-occur in some situations. For example, when allocating responsibilities to 
employees and monitoring their performance, a manager is likely to make decisions 
about the content of these responsibilities (i.e., which responsibilities to assign) and at the 
same time decide whether to allocate them in ways that promote or harm relational 
aspects (i.e., how to assign chosen responsibilities). For the sake of simplicity and in line 
with the leadership literature and taxonomies of managerial performance, I refer to these 
two broad categories as distinct, because despite their possible co-occurrence, the quality 
of managers’ performance on each type of tasks is independent. 
As noted by Colquitt and Greenberg (2003), despite the lack of integration 
between the fairness and leadership literatures, managerial behaviors discussed in both 
literatures overlap significantly. That is, effective relational performance mostly involves 
acting in way that adhere to the four categories of justice rules1 (Colquitt et al., 2013; 
Greenberg, 1990b): equitable allocation of outcomes in accordance with employees’ 
                                                 
1 For example, transformational leadership theory (Judge & Piccolo, 2004) emphasizes aspects such as 
individualized consideration which includes respectful treatment of employee (i.e., interpersonal justice), 
inspirational motivation which includes, among other things, providing employee with justification and 
logic for actions (i.e., informational justice), and intellectual stimulation which includes solicitation of 
employees’ ideas (i.e., voice as part of procedural justice). In addition, contingent rewards (part of 
transactional leadership) involves clarification of expectations and establishment of rewards for meeting 




inputs (“distributive”; Adams, 1965); provision of opportunities to influence the decision 
making process and appeal decisions, making decisions based on accurate information, 
and in a consistent, bias free, and ethical manner (“procedural”; Leventhal, 1980); 
provision of adequate explanations for decisions in an candid and honest manner 
(“informational”; Bies & Moag, 1986); and treatment of employees in dignified, sincere, 
and respectful manner in everyday interactions (“interpersonal”; Bies & Moag, 1986). As 
my focus in on why and when managers behave unfairly towards their employees, and as 
I compare such behaviors with those relating to core technical tasks, I use the term justice 
tasks to refer to relational aspects of managers’ performance2.  
To clarify, the terms fairness and justice are frequently used interchangeably. 
However, scholars now distinguish the two: fairness is a judgment made by a recipient 
(e.g., the employee) about the appropriateness of an actor’s (e.g., the manager) actions 
based on a comparison of these actions to a relevant justice rule (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; 
Cropanzano, Fortin, & Kirk, 2015). Thus, the term fairness describes how recipients 
describe the treatment accorded to them (i.e., I was treated fairly); on the other hand, the 
terms justice, “justice rule adherence” (e.g., Scott et al., 2009) or “justice enactment” 
(e.g., Blader, Wiesenfeld, Rothman, & Wheeler-Smith, 2010), describe the extent to 
which actors’ actions align with different rules of justice (e.g., was I given an opportunity 
to voice my concerns before the decision?). The assumption underlying this distinction is 
that when managers’ actions adhere to relevant justice rules, employees are more likely to 
perceive their treatment as fair (Cropanzano et al., 2015). Hence, if a manager allocates 
an outcome equitably, she is adhering to the distributive justice rule, and her employees 
                                                 
2 I use the term task(s) to describe behaviors and activities in each category. I use the term performance to 





are more likely to perceive such a distribution as fair. This paper centers on managerial 
behaviors, as opposed to employees’ judgments of the appropriateness of these actions; 
hence, I mostly use the term justice rather than fairness to describe managers’ actions and 
performance. 
Personal Resources, Perceived Workload, and Prioritization 
Engaging in core technical and justice tasks requires personal resources. A 
resource is a stock of assets that can be drawn by a person to function effectively 
(“Resource,” 2015). Personal resources are intangible assets (i.e., time, attention, and 
effort) that managers draw on to complete their tasks. Managers spend personal resources 
on physical activities (e.g., writing a report), while thinking and communicating or 
interacting with others, and when regulating emotional states, for instance, attempting to 
deal with negative emotions (Quinn et al., 2012). Personal resources are limited and 
scarce. There are only a limited number of hours a day (Bergeron, 2007; Mueller & 
Kamdar, 2011); attention is bounded by managers’ ability to process information 
(Ocasio, 1997; Walsh, 1995); and willpower requires drawing from a finite pool of self-
control (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). Hence, once personal resources are used for a task, 
they are not available for other tasks (Bergeron, 2007; Quinn et al., 2012) and the more 
an individual allocates resources towards one task the less are left for other tasks 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002).  
Core technical tasks frequently involve processing of large amounts of 
information thus necessitating cognitive effort (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), require 
physical presence of managers away from their employees (e.g., a meeting with a client, 




and also require self-control in the face of natural inclinations to do otherwise, especially 
for tasks that are not inherently interesting (Beal et al., 2005; Muraven, Gagné, & 
Rosman, 2008) such as focusing on the content of a report instead of tweaking the 
formatting or taking a break to surf the web. Similarly, justice tasks frequently demand 
processing a lot of information to ensure equitable allocations of resources to employees 
(Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011), involve spending time and effort listening to 
employees and providing justifications for decisions (Brockner et al., 2009), take effort to 
suppress tendencies to act in a biased manner (e.g., allocating outcomes based on liking 
as opposed to merit; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Johnson et al., 2014) or to 
reciprocate employees rude behaviors (Barnes, Lucianetti, Bhave, & Christian, 2014), 
and involve preparation as well as cognitive and emotional effort when communicating 
“bad news” sensitively (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008; Richter, König, Koppermann, & 
Schilling, 2016). 
Because personal resources are limited and scarce, the more tasks are expected 
from managers, the less likely it is that they will be able to meet the requirements of these 
multiple tasks effectively. When the amount of work managers face passes a certain 
threshold, managers are likely to experience high perceived workload, the subjective 
judgment that one’s work requires one to do more than one can handle given one’s 
available personal resources (Ilies et al., 2015; Spector & Jex, 1998). High perceived 
workload likely results from a combination of the quantity of the tasks one faces and the 
personal resources (including time) available for their completion. Perceived workload is 
related to, but distinct from, actual workload (e.g., hours worked or the number of 




based on their personal resources and idiosyncratic perceptions, perceive different levels 
of workload. I focus on perceived level of workload, because this perception is usually 
more strongly associated with people’s reactions to such workload (Hambrick et al., 
2005). Perceived workload is associated with a host of negative physical and affective 
reactions ranging from feelings of strain, frustration, decreased work satisfaction, and 
fatigue to reduced health and increased work-family conflict (Ilies, Dimotakis, & De 
Pater, 2010; Ilies et al., 2015; Spector & Jex, 1998). Experienced workload is one of the 
strongest predictors of burnout and emotional exhaustion (Hobfoll & Shirom, 2001; Lee 
& Ashforth, 1996). Given the aversive experiences that accompany high levels of 
perceived workload, people frequently attempt to reduce workload through different 
coping strategies (Barnes & Van Dyne, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2005).  
Resource allocation theory (Bergeron, 2007; Emsley, 2003; Hockey, 1997) 
suggests that people reduce workload by prioritizing tasks (Northcraft et al., 2011; 
Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). Therefore, managers should respond to workload by prioritizing 
one task or category of tasks over another task or category of tasks, through a shift in the 
investment of personal resources to the prioritized task (Unsworth, Yeo, & Beck, 2014). 
Prioritization in this context means that managers choose between activities (completely 
or partly) or change the order, sequence, or timing in which actions are carried out. For 
example, if a manager has two tasks due the next day (e.g., a report for management and 
employee’s performance evaluation) she can spend more time on one rather than the 
other, complete one task (but not the other) in a more comprehensive or rigorous manner, 
or she can choose to do one task before the other or do it when he or she is more effective 




completion of de-prioritized activities will be carried out with less personal resources 
available to facilitate attention and persistence and thus is more likely to result in 
decreased performance (Beal et al., 2005). As a result, workload can be negatively 
associated with one performance category (e.g., justice) and have no (or lower) 
association with a different category (e.g., core technical). Indeed, because people react 
to workload by investing less personal resources in certain tasks, higher levels of 
perceived workload are frequently negatively associated with performance on those tasks 
(Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; Barnes & Van Dyne, 2009). Consistent with this, when 
employees prioritize one task type over another, their performance on the second task 
suffers, especially if they have poor time management skills, and thus less personal 
resources available (Barnes et al., 2008; Rapp, Bachrach, & Rapp, 2013).   
According to resource allocation theory, prioritization is based on outcome 
expectancies associated with each task (DeShon & Gillespie, 2005; Unsworth et al., 
2014) or “the extent to which one sees a causal relationship between one’s behavior and 
the positive or negative outcomes that one expects” (Latham, 2001, p. 708). For instance, 
when faced with two opposing tasks, people invest their personal resources in the 
incentivized task (i.e., has a reward associated with it; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; Wright, 
George, Farnsworth, & McMahan, 1993) or the task on which they receive more 
feedback about (DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004; Northcraft 
et al., 2011). This is because rewards and feedback increase the belief that performance 
on this task will lead to desired outcomes, thus increasing commitment to the relevant 
task or goal (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Consistent with this, when people are more 




inhibition of other competing goals, and this especially true when the two goals are likely 
to be seen as competing, rather than complementary (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 
2002), usually found under situations of resource scarcity such as high workload.  Thus, 
workload affects people’s decisions on which task(s) to prioritize based on their outcome 
expectancies of each task. 
 
Prioritization of Core Technical Tasks over Justice Tasks 
I argue that perceived workload will be positively associated with prioritization of 
core technical tasks over justice tasks, and hence to stronger negative effects of workload 
on justice (as compared to core technical) performance. This likely occurs because, on 
average, managers hold weaker outcome expectancies for justice, as compared to core 
technical performance, which leads them to prioritize core technical tasks when faced 
with higher workloads3. This is due to two related reasons. First, people generally tend to 
value core technical tasks over more relational aspects with which justice is usually 
associated, especially in achievement settings such as the workplace. For example, social 
psychology research has demonstrated that when faced with a choice, people tend to 
choose activities that relate to competence or agency (i.e., core technical skills) over 
those that relate to communion or morality (cf., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; see also: 
Vermunt, 2014). Similarly, when choosing leaders for challenging contexts (e.g., 
organizational downsizing), people tend to prefer individuals who are perceived as being 
able to “get work done” even when such individuals have a reputation for acting unfairly 
(vs. fairly; Rothman, Wheeler-Smith, Wiesenfeld, & Galinsky, 2015).  
                                                 
3 Note that my argument is not that justice performance outcome expectancies are weak in the absolute 




Second, outcome expectancies regarding justice rule adherence are diffuse, less 
observable, and usually accrue over time (Brockner, 2010) and therefore it is likely more 
difficult for managers to identify how acting justly leads to desirable outcomes. For 
instance, unless organizations deliberately instruct managers on the benefits of justice 
rules adherence, managers struggle to identify the link between them and desirable 
personal outcomes (Cole & Latham, 1997). In contrast, technical expertise and the clear 
performance measures associated with core technical tasks make it very easy for 
managers to imagine the causal link between these behaviors and desired outcomes. 
Relatedly, organizations also emphasize task-related results and competencies and 
strongly represent them in the decision processes for valued outcomes such as bonuses 
and promotions while at the same time justice tasks, which are harder to measure, are not 
similarly emphasized (Brockner et al., 2009; Frost & Robinson, 1999; Gallup, 2015; 
Kerr, 1975). Likewise, feedback from upper management is more frequent and immediate 
when it comes to core technical tasks as feedback about justice requires bottom-up 
feedback from subordinates which is rarer (Ashford, Blatt, & VandeWalle, 2003).  
To summarize, when managers face high workloads and are forced to prioritize 
between their tasks, they are more likely to prioritize core technical tasks, because, 
relative to justice tasks, they likely hold stronger outcome expectancies about these tasks. 
As fewer resources get allocated towards justice tasks, performance on such tasks should 
be more negatively affected.      
Hypothesis 1: Managers’ perceived workload is more negatively associated with 
their justice than with their core technical performance and this effect is mediated by 




As seen in Figure 1, although I argue that the relatively lower outcome 
expectancies for justice performance will translate into prioritization of core technical 
tasks in the face of workload, I also propose that this effect can be attenuated to the extent 
that organizations introduce strong and clear rewards for justice performance. For 
example, in some organizations managers’ compensation and promotion potential is 
partly determined through 360° feedback practices, where employees evaluate managers 
not only on task-related competencies, but also on interpersonal skills (i.e., interpersonal 
justice), effectiveness in decision making and allocation of resources to employees (i.e., 
distributive and procedural justice), and the ability to keep employees motivated and 
engaged (Facteau, Facteau, Schoel, Russell, & Poteet, 1998; Smither & Walker, 2004). 
Similarly, some organizations explicitly reward (through tangible and intangible rewards 
such as manager of the month or promotions) managers known for their interpersonal and 
motivational skills (Brockner, 2006). To the extent that such practices are consistently 
used by the organization (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004), managers are more regularly provided 
feedback regarding their justice performance, have more visible and clear role models for 
relational and justice tasks, and have a better understanding of the link between such 
tasks and desired outcomes and thus should hold relatively stronger performance 
outcome expectancies (Brockner et al., 2009; Brockner, 2010). This should result in more 
balanced outcome expectancies, in turn affecting managers’ prioritization decisions. 
Indirect support for my arguments comes from a study suggesting that when 
managers are directly incentivized for task performance, voluntary turnover of non-
managerial employees increases; however, this effect is attenuated when the organization 




To the extent that turnover is caused by perceptions of unfair treatment (Cohen-Charash 
& Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 2001), this supports the argument that incentives can increase 
justice performance outcome expectancies and translate into better justice performance. 
A few qualitative studies also indirectly support my arguments. For instance, Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) describe how, when employee morale and employee suggestions began to 
be explicitly measured and rewarded by an organizational balanced scorecard, not only 
did managers’ behaviors focused on ensuring morale and soliciting suggestions increase, 
but managers were also able to more clearly identify how these two issues assisted in 
obtaining other desired outcomes such as customer satisfaction. Similarly, Jazayeri and 
Scapens (2008) describe the adoption of a value scorecard in BAE systems, a UK 
aerospace company. When BAE added people management to its managers’ scorecard 
and set explicit measurement criteria for personal development and an employee opinion 
survey, managers started spending more time interacting with employees. Taken together, 
I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of managers’ workload on prioritization of core 
technical tasks (over justice tasks) is moderated by organizational rewards for justice 
performance such that when such rewards are low, justice performance is prioritized less 
than when rewards are high. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of managers’ workload on performance via prioritization 
is moderated by organizational rewards for justice performance such that when such 





Chapter 3: Overview of Studies 
 
To balance internal and external validity concerns (Pedhazur & Pedhazur 
Schmelkin, 1991), I conducted three studies to test my theoretical model. Study 1 was an 
initial experimental study conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk and was aimed to 
explore whether people’s performance on core technical and justice tasks would be 
differently affected when their levels of perceived workload was randomly manipulated. 
After establishing this general tendency in Study 1, I further extended these findings in 
Study 2 where I conducted a managerial simulation with business undergraduate students 
by manipulating both the levels of perceived workload and justice rewards. In Study 2, I 
also provide evidence for my mediator—that is, that the interactive effects of workload 
and justice rewards affects the two performance types via prioritization of the core 
technical task. After establishing internal validity using experimental methods, in Study 
3, I provide evidence for external validity by collecting data from a diverse sample of 
managers and their direct employees. Study 3 provides further evidence as to the role that 







Chapter 4: Study 1 
 
Method 
Sample. I recruited English speaking working adults located in the U.S from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. These participants were paid $2.5 for completing the study and offered 
an additional $1 bonus for high performance levels. Based on recommendations by 
Huang and colleagues (Huang, Bowling, Liu, & Li, 2014; Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 2014), 
I employed a number of methods to screen out participants who displayed low effort in 
responding, including attention checks and examination of open-ended responses for 
nonsensical answers. Following this procedure, I excluded 37 participants from the initial 
sample of 270 participants who started the study, which resulted in a final sample of 233 
participants (52% male, Mage = 35.55 [SD = 11.34], Myears of work experience = 14.94 [SD = 
10.85], 70% currently working full or part time, 32% currently assuming a managerial 
position, 70% with a college degree education or higher).  
Procedure. When testing for psychological processes such as perceptions or 
judgments, role playing simulations are appropriate even if they do not use the actual 
population studied (i.e., actual managers; Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). In line with 
Greenberg and Eskew’s recommendations, I developed a realistic, low specificity 
response situation within a generalized setting so that participants can easily imagine 
filling such a role. In particular, I invited participants to complete a managerial inbox 
simulation online. Inbox simulations and exercises have been frequently used in the past 




Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). Participants started the simulation by reading background 
information about the company and their role in it. I told them that they worked for a 
moderate-sized, publicly traded company specializing in providing solutions to other 
companies’ technological and integration problems. I described their role as a senior 
client liaison manager who negotiated contract terms with clients and managed a team of 
6 technology experts who helped with routine tasks. Participants then read the following:  
You have been working hard over the last few days to finish a number of urgent tasks and 
“putting out fires.” Despite your efforts, urgent things just kept piling up, and you did not 
finish all tasks you had to complete. Today, you are leaving to attend a week-long 
mandatory leadership training (for a week you will not be able to use email or complete 
any substantial work). But you still have a number of urgent tasks that your boss 
requested you complete before you leave for training. 
Next, I told participants that they have 10/15 minutes (depending on the 
manipulated workload condition, as explained below) to complete two important tasks. 
Participants read a short description of each task (in random order). One task was labeled: 
“Answering a client complaint” and was accompanied by the following text: 
According to ENS' internal policy, any client complaint needs to be addressed within 
three days. You already did all the "leg-work" and collected all relevant information, you 
now need to synthesize the information and communicate it to the client. To meet the 
internal deadline, you must send the message to the client today. 
I used this task to operationalize a core technical task as it clearly requires no 
interaction and/or decision making in relation to subordinates. In addition, it involves an 
external client as well as a direct monetary issue, aspects that frequently characterize core 
technical tasks and differentiate them from justice tasks that do not always have clearly 
perceived direct monetary implications and involve internal employees. The second task 
was labeled: “communicating a personnel decision to an employee” and was 
accompanied by the following text: 
Two of your employees were up for a promotion. Because of budget constraints, you are 
able to promote only one of them. You already made the decision, but due to HR rules, 




I used this task to operationalize a justice task for three reasons. First, 
communicating bad news to subordinates is a common task that managers face at work 
(Bies, 2013; Richter et al., 2016). Second, this task usually involves all rules of justice as 
it requires providing clear information about the procedural and distributive aspects of the 
decision and communicating the news in a interpersonal sensitive and respectful manner 
(Richter et al., 2016). Finally, similar tasks have been used by past research to study 
justice performance (e.g., Grant, Molinsky, Margolis, Kamin, & Schiano, 2009; Patient & 
Skarlicki, 2010). In order to exclude alternative explanations that one task was prioritized 
because it was more urgent, the instructions clearly specified that both tasks were due 
before the manager in the scenario had to leave for training.    
Following this, the workload manipulation was introduced. I manipulated 
perceived workload in two related ways: (a) through the time that participants had to 
complete both tasks (15 vs. 10 minutes) and (b) by describing the time requirements for 
the simulation differently. More specifically, I told all participants that their performance 
on the simulation would determine whether they were eligible for the extra bonus 
payment ($1) and that, doing well on both tasks would help their overall performance. In 
the low workload condition (N = 122), participants had 15 minutes to complete the two 
tasks and they read the following: 
Fifteen (15) minutes is a reasonable amount of time to complete these two 
tasks. If you are unable to complete both tasks well within the allotted 
time, you will need to use your judgment as a manager to maximize your 
performance on what you believe to be the most crucial task.  
In the high workload condition (N = 111), participants had 10 minutes to 
complete the two tasks and read a different message: 
Ten (10) minutes is NOT a lot of time to complete these two tasks. Although 




limitation, you will need to use your judgment as a manager to maximize 
your performance on what you believe to be the most crucial task.  
In addition, participants in both conditions read the following: 
This means you need to decide which task is more important, how much 
time and effort you want to expend on each task, and which task you 
should devote your attention to first. 
After some manipulation check questions about their perceptions of the two tasks, 
participants started the simulation. While completing the simulation, participants worked 
on a screen that contained a detailed text of the two tasks and information they had to use 
to complete each task (displayed in random order). For example, for the core technical 
task they could see information about the transactions that occurred with the client and 
the reasons the client was overbilled. In the justice task they saw performance 
information about both candidates that could be used to justify their decision. Each task 
description also included the relevant criteria for successful performance. I took great 
care to ensure that the tasks were equivalent in terms of the complexity of the information 
that participants were required to process, the length, and the perceived difficulty. As 
described above, I also highlighted that both tasks were requested by the participants’ 
“boss” to make sure the source of the task does not affect their prioritization decisions 
(i.e., tasks that come from your boss may seem more important). Pilot testing with a 
separate MTurk sample indicated that the tasks were comparable in terms of perceived 
difficulty and time needed to complete them successfully (about 7.5 minutes). The full 
text of the two tasks appears in Appendix A1. For both tasks, the information needed to 
successfully complete the assignment was embedded as a picture in order to prevent 
participants from simply copying and pasting it as their answer. Each task had its own 




appeared on the screen to make participants aware of the time constraints they were 
facing.   
Manipulation checks. I used two measures (employing a scale ranging from 1 = 
“Strongly Disagree” to 7 = “Strongly Agree”) to ensure that the workload manipulation 
worked as intended. First, as I manipulated workload through the time available for the 
task and as time pressure plays a significant role in perceptions of workload (Ilies et al., 
2015), I used an adapted 3-item version of a measure of felt time pressure by Kinicki and 
Vecchio (1994). An example item included: “There was just not enough time during the 
simulation to complete all my tasks” (α = .77). I also included a 3-item measure of effort 
on the simulation from the internal motivation inventory (e.g., Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 
1991) to rule out the possibility that workload affected the effort that participants put into 
the simulation. Sample item was: “I put a lot of effort into the simulation” (α =.89). Effort 
was weakly correlated with felt-time pressure (r = .22, p = .001). I subjected these two 
variables to a MANOVA analysis with workload condition as the independent variable (0 
= low; 1 = high). Results indicated a significant main effect for the workload condition 
on felt time pressure, but not on effort: time pressure: Mlow = 4.36, Mhigh = 5.52; (F[1, 
231] = 26.14, p < .000, ηp2 = .10); effort: Mlow = 6.58, Mhigh = 6.51; (F[1, 231] = .75, p = 
.387, ηp2 = .00). These results support the efficacy of my manipulation.  
As prioritizing of different tasks and their performance is likely affected by 
perceived self-efficacy for each task (Schmidt & Dolis, 2009), I also wanted to ensure 
that there were no differences in participants perceived self-efficacies for the two tasks. 
After reading about the tasks but before they started the simulation, participants answered 




adapted from Chen et al. (2000; α = .94, .93 for core technical and justice respectively) 
with a scale ranging from 1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree.” A sample 
item was: “I feel confident in my ability to complete this task well.” Paired sample t-tests 
indicated that participants’ perceived self-efficacy did not differ between the two tasks 
(Mdifference = .08 [SD = .74], t [232] = 1.59, p = .113).  
Core technical and justice performance. The messages that participants wrote 
for each of the tasks (i.e., to the client and to the employee who was not promoted) were 
coded in order to assess performance. I developed a specific coding scheme for each task 
based on the instructions, the justice and customer service literatures, and an iterative 
examination of participants’ actual responses. Specifically, the core technical task (i.e., 
client complaint) was evaluated on aspects such as clarity and accuracy of explanation, 
the extent to which the participant apologized for the mistake, and whether the message 
highlighted the relationship of the company with the client. These criteria correspond to 
general service performance criteria of reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and 
empathy (Liao, Toya, Lepak, & Hong, 2009; Parasuraman, Berry, & Zeithaml, 1991). 
The justice task (i.e., the promotion decision) was evaluated on aspects such as clarity of 
the explanation about the decision (distributive and informational justice), information 
provided about the process used to make the decision (procedural justice), sensitivity of 
communication and motivation provided to the employee (interpersonal justice). Note 
that although similar tasks in the past have been used mainly to assess aspects of 
interpersonal and informational justice (e.g., Patient & Skarlicki, 2010), I deliberately 
adapted the instructions and criteria to include procedural and distributive elements based 




wrote for each task, randomized their order, and then two independent coders who were 
blind to the conditions coded the messages. Coders rated each response on a scale from 0-
5; see Appendix A2 for examples of responses and respective coding). Coders achieved 
good agreement in their rating of the performance on the core technical task (ICC[2] = 
.92; rwgmean = .87) and justice task (ICC[2] = .88; rwgmean = .86). Any large discrepancies 
between coders (i.e., more than 1 point difference in ratings between the coders) were 
resolved, and coders’ scores were averaged to arrive at one performance score for each 
participant on each task. Scores were standardized prior to analysis to ease comparison 
and interpretation. 
Results 
The zero-order correlation between the two performance types was not significant 
(r = -.01, p = .897). Workload condition was negatively associated with core technical 
performance  (r = -.15, p = .022) and more negatively associated with justice performance 
(r = -.33, p < .000) as indicated by a test of the difference of correlations (t[233] = 2.03, p 
= .004; Howell, 2007).  
As performance type was a within person variable (i.e., each participant 
completed both tasks and thus performance is nested within individuals), I submitted 
performance on the two tasks to a 2 (workload condition: low vs. high) X 2 (performance 
type: core technical [client complaint] vs. justice [promotion decision]) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the second factor. A significant interaction of the workload 
condition (between-person factor) and the performance type (within person factor) 
indicates that the workload’s relationship with each performance type is significantly 




interaction emerged (F[1, 231] = 4.56, p = .054, ηp2 = .02). As seen in Table 1, pairwise 
comparisons suggested that the means for both core technical and justice performance 
were lower in the high as compared to the low workload condition (core technical: F[1, 
231] = 5.28, p = .022, ηp2 = .02; justice: F[1, 231] = 28.01, p < .000, ηp2 = .11). The 
significant interaction means that the relative drop in justice performance (from .31 to -
.34) was more severe than that of the core technical performance (from .14 to -.16). 
Supplementary Analysis 
Although Study 1 did not manipulate the moderator, justice rewards, I conducted 
some supplementary analyses as an initial test of the role of justice rewards in affecting 
managers’ prioritization decisions. Because participants’ overall success on the 
simulation was directly tied to a monetary reward, I measured the extent to which 
participants believed that performing well on each task could lead to such success. Given 
that this variable was measured, rather than manipulated, this also allowed me to observe 
whether people naturally tend to perceive justice tasks as being associated with less 
rewards. As my theory focuses on the relative importance of justice rewards, I used one 
continuum to measure beliefs about core technical and justice rewards. In particular, after 
participants read the short description of the two tasks and directly after I reminded them 
about the reward, but before they started the simulation, I asked them the following 
question: “Given the information above, which of the tasks is more important for your 
success on the simulation?” Participants indicated their answer using a slider (varying 
from 1 = “Answering a client compliant is more important,” to 9 = “Communicating a 
personnel decision to an employee is more important,” with the middle of the scale, 5 = 




performing well on the justice task would be more likely to make one eligible for the 
monetary reward. The mean score was 3.92 (SD = 1.80; significantly lower than then 
middle of the scale [“5”], t(232) = -9.12, p < .000) which suggests participants viewed the 
core technical task as more related to their success and a possible reward than the justice 
task.  
To test whether such perceptions of justice rewards qualified the effects of 
workload condition on performance of the two tasks, I included this variable as a 
moderator in the analysis reported above. As expected, a workload condition X 
performance type X justice rewards interaction emerged (F [1, 229] = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 
= .02) suggesting that the differences in performance across workload conditions differed 
as a function of justice rewards. I plotted this interaction (Figure 2) and conducted simple 
slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). In terms of core technical performance, in the low 
workload condition, there were no differences in performance when perceived justice 
rewards were low (-1SD) or high (+1 SD; B = .07, p = .468); however, in the high 
workload condition, performance was higher when perceived justice rewards were low as 
compared to high (B = -.20, p = .020). In terms of justice performance, in the low 
workload condition, there were no differences in performance when perceived justice 
rewards were low (-1SD) or high (+1 SD; (B = .09, p = .357). However, in the high 
workload condition, performance was lower when perceived justice rewards were low as 
compared to high (B = .18, p = .027). These results give initial support for my argument 
that justice rewards play a moderating role between perceived workload and core 




Study 1: Discussion 
 Study 1 provided initial support to my theoretical model in a controlled 
experimental setting. When participants, simulating the role of managers, experienced 
high workloads, both their task and justice performance suffered, but justice performance 
suffered more than core technical performance. This supports my argument that workload 
is not uniformly related to managerial performance and that, in order to better understand 
the effects of workload on managers’ performance, there is a need to explore competing 
managerial requirements. Furthermore, supplementary analyses provided initial 
correlational evidence regarding the role that perceived organizational rewards play in 
driving prioritization of core technical tasks over justice tasks under high workload 
conditions. My analysis suggested that prioritization differences, as reflected in 
participants’ performance on the two tasks, were driven by their belief about which task 
is more likely to lead to a reward.  
There are a number of limitations related to the generalizability of the inferences I 
can draw from Study 1. First, in Study 1’s simulation, the core technical and the justice 
tasks were artificially separated. In reality, managers frequently engage in job 
responsibilities that involve a mix of both types of tasks. Second, although the 
measurement of justice rewards and the supplementary analysis provided some insight 
into the moderating role that such rewards play in affecting the different types of 
performance through prioritization, a stronger test of my theoretical model would involve 
a direct manipulation of such rewards in conjunction with workload. Third, in Study 1, 
the mediating mechanism, prioritization was assumed (i.e., reflected in performance) 




Chapter 5:  Study 2 
 
 
Sample and Procedure 
Sample. I recruited 249 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
strategic management class in an East Coast public University in the U.S. to complete a 
one-hour simulation in return for course credit (Mage = 22.1 [SD = 1.84], 50% female, 
55% Caucasian, 8% African-American, 10% Hispanic-Latino, 26% Asian). Participants 
were told that higher performance on the simulation would increase their chance to win a 
$100 monetary reward. I excluded from the initial sample 10 participants who provided 
nonsensical answers to the simulation and thus the final sample included 239 participants.       
Procedure. Study 2 procedure was similar to that of Study 1, with the following 
changes. First, due to the higher complexity of the tasks involved in Study 2, workload 
was manipulated so there were 30 minutes to complete the two tasks in the low workload 
condition (N = 121) and 20 minutes in the high workload condition (N = 118). The new 
allotted times were based on pilots conducted with people drawn from a similar sample. 
Second, to make the tasks more interrelated, I slightly adapted the two tasks. The core 
technical task now involved completing a business proposal directed at the participants’ 
direct boss. I told participants that they had been working on convincing their boss to 
create a new client acquisition role and that they must complete the proposal by the end 
of the allotted time so that their boss can take it up to higher management for final 
approval. They were asked to make a business case (e.g., review costs and benefits and 




possible employees to be promoted to the new role. This is where the core technical task 
overlapped with the justice task, which required participants, as in Study 1, to write a 
message to the employee who was not chosen to be promoted to new role. I explained 
that due to the company’s HR rules that because the name of the employee recommended 
for the new position needs to be included in the proposal, the message to the employee 
who was not chosen had to be done in writing on the same day as the proposal. In this 
way, the decision making process and relevant information presented to participants 
could be used to complete both tasks and thus their performance reflects a more direct 
prioritization of the two tasks within one job requirement (the full text of the two tasks is 
presented in Appendix B1).  
The third difference was the direct manipulation of the justice rewards. In 
particular, after reading background information about the simulation and their role, 
participants in the low justice rewards condition (N = 120) read the following:  
About the culture in ENS. ENS values productivity and excellent levels of 
performance that can help maintain its position in the market. Managers in 
ENS are evaluated and rewarded on the extent to which they get things 
done, ensure productivity, and help maintain ENS’ competitiveness is the 
market. Below, is a snapshot of the managerial performance appraisal 
form used at ENS. As the weights indicate, productivity and performance 
are weighted quite heavily in how managers' success is determined… 
 I then presented participants with a “balanced scorecard,” a table which included 
three performance criteria with corresponding weights and example behaviors: (a) 
productivity and performance was weighted 70%, (b) managing employees and treating 
them fairly was weighted 20%, and (c) being a good organizational citizen was weighted 






About the culture in ENS. ENS values its employees and maintains that if 
they are well treated it can help maintain its position in the market. In 
addition to productivity considerations, Managers in ENS are evaluated 
and rewarded on the extent to which they treat their employees 
respectfully, provide employees with explanations for personnel decisions, 
and give them feedback about how they can improve. Below, is a snapshot 
of the managerial performance appraisal form used at ENS. As the weights 
indicate, in addition to productivity and performance, the extent to which 
managers treat employees fairly is weighted quite heavily in how 
managers' success is determined…        
I presented participants in the high justice reward condition the same balanced 
scorecard table but with the weights changed so “productivity and performance” and 
“managing employees and treating them fairly” were both equally weighted at 45%. As 
in Study 1, each task had its own dedicated textbox where participants could write their 
messages and countdown timers appeared on the screen to make participants aware of the 
time constraints they were facing. When they started the simulation they were also given 
a physical envelope, which contained a hardcopy of relevant information needed to 
successfully complete both tasks (e.g., analysis of competitors, employees’ personnel file, 
relevant costs of the new role, etc.). 
Manipulation checks. To test whether the workload manipulation worked as 
intended, I employed the same measures of perceived time pressure (α = .80) and effort 
(α = .90) used in Study 1. Effort was weakly correlated with felt-time pressure (r = .25, p 
= .001). I subjected these two variables to a MANOVA analysis with workload condition 
as the independent variable (0 = low; 1 = high). Results indicated a significant main 
effect for the workload condition on felt time pressure, but not on effort: time pressure: 
Mlow = 3.57, Mhigh = 4.81; (F[1, 237] = 38.69, p < .000, ηp2 = .14); effort: Mlow = 5.45, 
Mhigh = 5.60 (F[1, 237] = .75, p = .365, ηp2 = .00). These results support the efficacy of 




To test the efficacy of the rewards manipulation, I asked participants whether they 
agreed (using a scale ranging from 1= “Strongly Disagree” to 5 = “Strongly Agree.”) with 
five statements. Three statements focused on core technical rewards (i.e., “Managers at 
ENS are mainly rewarded for being productive and getting things done,” “Focusing my 
time and effort on productivity and performance is likely to make me very successful as a 
manager at ENS”, and “My success as a manager in ENS depends more on my 
productivity level than on how I manage my employees”; α = .76) and two focused on 
justice rewards (i.e., “Managers at ENS are evaluated and rewarded based on the extent 
to which employees feel respected and well treated” and “Treating employee fairly (for 
example, explaining decisions) is a major part of my success as a manager in ENS”; α = 
.78). These two variables were strongly negatively correlated (r = -.56, p < .000). I 
subjected these two variables to a MANOVA analysis with justice rewards condition as 
the independent variable (0 = low; 1 = high). Results indicated that the reward 
manipulation worked as intended. The manipulation check for core technical rewards was 
higher in the in the low (M = 4.59) as compared to the high justice rewards condition (M 
= 3.04; F[1, 237] = .305.66,  p < .000; ηp2 = .56). In a similar vein, the manipulation 
check for justice rewards was lower in the in the low (M = 3.00) as compared to the high 
justice reward condition (M = 4.49; F[1, 237] = .183.17,  p < .000; ηp2 = .44).  
In addition, to ensure that the relative importance of the two tasks was 
manipulated, I used an additional manipulation check. After they read about the 
simulation and directly after I reminded them that higher performance will increase their 
chances to win a $100 monetary reward, but before they started the simulation, I asked 




the two tasks, in your opinion, which of the two tasks is more important for your success 
as a manager in ENS?” Participants indicated their answer using a slider (varying from 1 
= “Completing an official proposal for the new client acquisition role,” to 9 = 
“Explaining your decision to your employee,” with the middle of the scale, 5 = indicating 
“Both tasks are equally important”). Further supporting the efficacy of the justice 
rewards manipulation, an ANOVA analysis indicated that participants’ in the low justice 
rewards condition viewed the core technical task as more directly related to their success 
(M = 3.15) while participants’ in the high justice rewards condition were closer to 
viewing both tasks as equally important (M = 4.74) and these perceptions were 
significantly different (F[1, 237] = 67.99, p < . 001, ηp2 = .22). 
Measures 
Core technical and justice performance. As in Study 1, the messages that 
participants wrote for each of the tasks were coded to assess performance. Similar criteria 
to those used in Study 1, adapted to the specific tasks in this study, were used to assess 
performance (task descriptions included the relevant criteria for successful performance, 
see Appendix B1). I separated the messages that participants wrote for each task, 
randomized their order, and then two independent coders who were blind to the 
conditions coded each message. Coders rated responses using a scale from 0-5; see 
Appendix B2 for examples highly rated responses). Coders achieved good agreement on 
the core technical task (ICC[2] = .92; rwgmean = .92) and justice task (ICC[2] = .86; 
rwgmean = .77). Any large discrepancies between coders (i.e., more than 1 point difference 
in ratings between the coders) were resolved, and coders’ scores were averaged to arrive 




prior to analysis to ease comparison and interpretation. 
Prioritization of the core technical task over the justice task. In line with 
previous studies that operationalized prioritization as time and effort spent on different 
tasks (e.g., Northcraft et al., 2011), after participants completed the simulation, they rated 
their prioritization decisions using three items: “I spent more time on the proposal task 
because it was more important than the promotion decision task,” “I had to devote less 
time to the promotion decision task because I did not have enough time to do both tasks 
well,” and “I had to devote less effort to the promotion decision task because I did not 
have enough time to do both tasks well” (α = .79). 
Results 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
included in my analysis. To test my hypotheses, I conducted multilevel regression 
analyses using random coefficient modeling (RCM) in R. Note that core technical and 
justice performance are within person variables nested within managers. Thus, 
performance was treated as a level 1 variable and all other variables as level 2 (the 
individual manager level). Table 3 presents the results of my regression analysis. As seen 
in Table 3 (Model 1), perceived workload was marginally positively related to 
prioritization (B = .12, p = .056). To test whether prioritization differently related to each 
performance type, I interacted prioritization (between-person variable) with performance 
type (within person variable). A significant interaction implies that the relationships 
between each performance type and prioritization are significantly different than one 
another. This interaction was significant (B = -.36, p < .001; Table 3, Model 3) and is 




technical task) was not related to core technical performance (B = .07, p = .320) but was 
negatively related to justice performance (B = -.30, p < .001). Together, these findings 
provided partial support for Hypothesis 1.  
 Hypothesis 2 suggested that justice rewards would moderate the effect of 
perceived workload on prioritization. Supporting Hypothesis 2, the interaction between 
workload condition and rewards condition was significant (B = -.28, p = .022; Table 3, 
Model 2) and is plotted in Figure 4. A simple slopes analysis suggested that workload 
condition was positively related to prioritization of the core technical task in the low 
justice rewards condition (B = .26, p = .003), but unrelated to prioritization in high justice 
rewards condition (B = -.02, p = .783).  
 I tested Hypothesis 3, which represents my entire theoretical model, in two stages. 
I first submitted performance on the two tasks to a 2 (workload condition: low vs. high) 
X 2 (justice rewards: low vs. high) X 2 (performance type: core technical vs. justice) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. A significant three-way interaction 
(i.e., workload condition, justice rewards condition, and performance type) indicates that 
the relationship of workload condition with each of the performance types differs 
significantly for the two justice reward conditions. As expected, a significant workload 
condition X rewards condition X performance type interaction emerged (F[1, 235] = 
3.98, p = .047, ηp2 = .02). Note that the same exact result is reflected in the three-way 
interaction in the multilevel regression analysis (Table 3, Model 4). As seen in Table 4, 
although performance on the core technical task was lower in the high (as compared to 
low) workload condition, it did not vary as a result of the justice rewards condition. In 




workload condition, but in the low justice rewards, high workload resulted in even lower 
performance as compared with high workload in the high justice rewards condition.  
Next, to test the entire conceptual model I calculated and compared the indirect 
effects of workload condition on the two types of performance via prioritization at 
different justice rewards conditions using a Monte Carlo-based simulation (Selig & 
Preacher, 2008). As seen in Table 5, the indirect effect of workload on justice 
performance via prioritization was negative only when justice rewards were low (95% 
CI: -.14, -.02) and was significantly different from the indirect effect of workload on 
justice performance via prioritization when justices rewards were high (95% CI: .05, .20). 
I also compared this indirect effect to the effect of workload on core technical 
performance via prioritization when justice rewards were low and these indirect effects 
were also significantly different (95% CI: .02, .14). These results support Hypothesis 3. 
Study 2: Discussion 
Study 2 provided additional support for my theoretical model with a different 
sample using an altered simulation (which included tasks that were interrelated rather 
than artificially separated). Study 2 also provided casual evidence regarding the 
moderating effects justice rewards play in affecting prioritization and performance. 
Finally, Study 2 provided evidence that explicit prioritization decisions are related to 
reductions in justice performance in the face of high workload and low rewards for 
justice performance.  
Although, together, Studies 1 and 2 provide support for my theoretical model, the 
samples and the relatively simplified simulation of managerial roles used in both studies 




environments. In particular, in both studies, the simulation required participants to choose 
between the two tasks (i.e., either-or prioritization) while in real organizational settings 
managers face multiple tasks and have more leeway to postpone tasks and ensure that all 
tasks are met over longer periods of time despite high workloads. Moreover, the justice 
tasks in both studies involved a writing task that is likely to emphasize some aspects of 
justice (i.e., interpersonal, informational) more than others. In addition, it is possible that 
the specific operationalizations of the tasks were responsible for observed effects. For 
example, because in both Studies 1 and 2, the core task was more quantifiable (i.e., in 
terms of having monetary implications) in nature, this could have led to their 
prioritization under high workloads. Although such monetary implications usually 
represent and distinguish core technical from justice tasks, the effects of the quantifiable 
nature of the core task cannot be ruled out as an alternative explanation and represents a 
limitation of this methodology. To address these issues I designed Study 3 to test my 




Chapter 6:  Study 3 
 
I was not aware of any pre-existing scales intended to measure whether managers 
prioritize their core technical tasks over their justice tasks and the extent to which 
different performance aspects are rewarded by organizations. Therefore, I first conducted 
a pilot study to establish the validity of the scales that I intended to use in Study 3. 
A Pilot Study to Develop Scales for Prioritization and Rewards 
Procedure. I recruited participants for the pilot study using a snowball sampling 
technique (Grant & Mayer, 2009; Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2015; Zapata et al., 2013). 
As part of a class assignment for credit, undergraduate students participating in 
organizational behavior classes at a large Eastern university were asked to recruit a 
manager to complete a survey. Students had to recruit the manager from their own 
personal network and ensure that this person worked full time (more than 30 hours a 
week) and had at least 3 direct reports. Students provided me with full contact details of 
197 potential participants including email, company name, and phone number. I 
contacted these 197 managers directly through email with a link to the online survey. 
After two weeks, 164 managers completed the survey. I excluded 27 managers who 
reported not having at least one direct report and/or had missing data on the focal 
variables. The final sample for the pilot study thus included 137 managers (Mage = 41.32 
[SD = 12.59]; 38% were female, with an average of 10.70 [SD = 9.16] years of tenure in 





Core technical and justice rewards. I evaluated the extent to which managers 
believed that engaging in behaviors relating to core technical and justice tasks resulted in 
valued rewards from their organization. To make sure that I captured an array of valued 
rewards, in the survey, I defined rewards to include both tangible aspects (e.g., bonuses, 
promotions) and intangible aspects (e.g., recognition, praise). I used 4 items to represent 
behaviors relating to core technical tasks. In particular, I adapted items based on 
Welbourne, Johnson, and Amir’s (1998) job dimension role-based performance scale. In 
addition, I used 5 items to represent behaviors relating to justice tasks. I adapted four 
statements from Scott et al.’s (2014) measure of managerial discretion, which includes 
one item to refer to each category of rules of justice. I chose to adapt this measure as it 
was validated with a managerial population and established the validity of measuring 
each of the justice rules with one item. I added one item that referred to overall fair 
treatment of employees (e.g., “Treating our employees fairly”). Managers viewed the 
nine statements and rated the extent to which they agreed, using a 5-point scale (ranging 
from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”), that each of the statements 
accurately described whether their organization strongly rewards this behavior from 
managers such as themselves. 
Prioritization of core technical tasks over justice tasks. I developed four items 
to capture the extent to which managers prioritized their core technical tasks over justice 
tasks. As opposed to Study 2 where the two tasks were related but clearly labeled, for real 
managers core technical and justice tasks are frequently intertwined. Additionally, asking 
whether different aspects of core technical tasks are prioritized over each of the four 




artificial items that would lack face validity. Finally, I also wanted to make sure the items 
are distinct from those related to rewards, which as discussed above, referred to specific 
justice dimensions. Hence, I chose to use the broader relational category to construct 
items for prioritization of core technical over justice tasks rather than directly referring to 
specific justice dimensions. In particular, I asked managers to rate, using a 7-point scale 
(ranging from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree”), the extent to which they 
often find themselves prioritizing core technical tasks over more relational aspects of 
their role (e.g., treating employees fairly or keeping them motivated) using 4 items.   
Exploratory factor analysis. As seen in Table 6, exploratory factor analysis 
using principal axis factoring method with varimax rotation supported the factor structure 
of the three measures and explained 63.5% of the variance. All items loaded on their 
respective factors besides the adapted distributive justice item, which cross loaded on the 
rewards for core technical performance factor. These results provided initial support for 
the validity of these measures. Prioritization (α = .84) was significantly negatively related 
to the justice rewards measure (α = .90; r = -.31, p < .001) but not to the core technical 
rewards measure (α = .86; r = -.16, p = .066) and the two reward measures were strongly 
correlated (r = .66, p < .001). Once the validity of my scales was established, I conducted 
Study 3 to test my specific hypotheses. 
Data Collection for Hypothesis Testing 
Procedure. As my hypotheses focused on how differences in perceived workload 
and rewards that managers experience affect their performance, I needed a sample in 
which these two variables exhibited high variance. As this would have been less likely if 




to recruit managers from a wide variety of organizations and occupations. To do so, I 
utilized the snowball sampling technique which has been frequently used in the past to 
capture such diverse samples (Grant & Mayer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2015; Zapata et al., 
2013). As part of a class assignment for credit, I asked undergraduate students 
participating in organizational behavior classes at a large Eastern university to recruit one 
employee-manager dyad each for my study. This was done one semester after the pilot 
study the samples were completely independent of each other. Students had to recruit 
employees and managers from their own personal network and ensure that (a) they 
worked full time (more than 30 hours a week), (b) the employee directly reported to the 
manager, and (c) the manager had at least 3 direct reports including the recruited 
employee. I set the last criteria to ensure students understood that they were required to 
recruit people who were not only managers in terms of their title or position, but who 
actually had managerial responsibilities which required them to interact with employees 
and make decisions about them.    
Students provided me with the contact details of potential participants including 
email, company name, and phone number. I contacted participants directly via email with 
a link to an online survey. Overall, I contacted 497 manager-employee dyads. After two 
weeks, 457 employees and 462 managers completed the survey. I was able to match the 
response of 435 managers and employees. For my final sample, I excluded managers who 
reported not directly supervising any employees or who did not indicate how many 
employees they supervised. To make sure that the employees reporting on managers’ 
performance were familiar with the manager and were able to observe his or her behavior 




either a question assessing how frequently they interacted with the manager (on the 
following scale: 1 – “Never,” 2 – “Rarely,” 3 – “Sometimes,” 4 – “Often,” 5 – “All the 
time”) or how personally familiar they were with the managers’ work behavior as asked 
about in the survey (on the following scale 1 – “Very unfamiliar,” 2 – “Unfamiliar,” 3 – 
“Somewhat familiar,” 4 – “Familiar,” 5 – “Very familiar”). Finally, I excluded 
individuals whose surveys had substantial missing data on the focal study variables.  
Sample. The final sample, after listwise deletion, consisted of 389 manager-
employee dyads who worked full-time for a variety of industries including insurance, 
education, construction, accounting, financial services, government, hospitality, IT, and 
defense. Of the 389 managers, 61% were male. Further, 62% were Caucasian, 21% 
Asian, and 12% were African-American. 82% managers had at least a college education. 
The average age of managers was 44.56 years (SD = 12.12), their average tenure in their 
current organization was 10.65 years (SD = 9.05), and average tenure in the current 
position was 6.35 years (SD = 6.47). Managers occupied a wide variety of organizational 
levels (14% first level supervisors, 24% middle management, 23% upper middle 
management, 18% executive, and 21% top management) and reported that on average 
they had 11.33 (SD = 16.29) employees reporting directly to them. Of the 389 
employees, 55% were female. Further, 57% were Caucasian, 22% Asian, and 12% 
African-American. 67% of employees had at least a college education. The average age 
of employees was 36.47 (SD = 13.87) and their average tenure in their current 
organization was 4.87 (SD = 5.87) years. Employees were located lower in the 
organizational hierarchy as compared to managers (47% staff, 23% first level 






 Perceived workload. In line with my conceptualization of perceived workload 
and the manipulation of this variable in Studies 1 and 2, I chose to measure workload as 
individual managers’ perception that their work exceeds their capacity (or personal 
resources), especially in terms of time pressure. Managers reported their perceived 
workload using a 5-item measure adapted from previous research (e.g., Janssen, 2001; 
Van Yperen & Hagedoorn, 2003). In particular, I asked managers to think about their job, 
role, or situation at work over the last three months and respond to the following 
questions: “Do you have too much work to do?” Do you have to work extra hard to finish 
your tasks in time?” “Do you work under time pressure?” Do you have to rush through 
work?” “Do you have too little work?” (reverse coded) using a 5-point scale (1 = 
“Never,” 5 = “Always”; α = .73).  
Prioritization of core technical tasks over justice tasks. I measured the extent 
to which managers prioritized core technical tasks over justice tasks by using the scale 
developed in the pilot study (α = .82). Note that higher scores on this variable mean that 
managers tended to prioritize core technical tasks more than justice (or relational) tasks.  
Core technical and justice rewards. I measured whether managers believed that 
their organization rewards core technical and justice performance, using the measures 
developed in the pilot study (αjustice = .90; αcore technical = .86).  
Justice performance. I adapted Colquitt’s (2001) organizational justice scale of 
the four facets of justice rules. Given the focus of my theorizing on managers’ adherence 




(Rupp et al., 2014), and because the original items used to measure distributive and 
procedural rules are worded in broad terms and are usually used to operationalize justice 
rule adherence of the organization rather than the manager, I instructed employees to 
specifically think about their own manager (as opposed to the organization as a whole) 
when assessing their manager’s adherence to these two rules in addition to the 
informational and interpersonal ones (the survey software embedded the manager’s name 
into the questions). Because my theoretical arguments did not focus on one dimension, 
and because these dimensions are frequently highly correlated in field settings, I treated 
justice performance as an overall higher-order construct of the four dimensions (α = .80). 
This approach has been used by other researchers in the justice literature (Colquitt & 
Shaw, 2005; Zhang, Lepine, Buckman, & Wei, 2014).  
For all justice rules, I asked employees to think about the manager’s treatment of 
all his or her employees over the last three months. For distributive justice, I instructed 
employees to focus on the outcomes received from the manager (such as rewards, 
evaluations, promotions, desired and undesired assignments, recognition, etc.) and used 4 
items (e.g., “Do those outcomes reflect what employees have contributed to work?”). For 
procedural justice, I instructed employees to focus on the processes used to make 
decisions about these same outcomes and used 7 items (e.g., “Are those procedures free 
of bias?”). For the 5-item informational justice measure (e.g., “candidly communicate 
with employees?”) and the 4-item interpersonal justice measure (e.g., “treat employees 
with respect?”), I asked employees to think about the manager’s behavior in general. 
Employees used a 5-point scale to rate the justice performance measures (1 = “To a very 




Managers’ core technical performance. Although employees might not be ideal 
evaluators of managers’ core technical performance, prior research (Ashford & Tsui, 
1991; Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, & Fleenor, 1998) indicates that they still can be 
accurate sources of manager performance and leadership research has frequently used 
both upper-management and employee rated performance to evaluate leaders’ 
performance and effectiveness (Avolio, Sosik, Jung, & Berson, 2003). Further, given my 
dyadic sampling method (due to complexities involved in collecting triadic data, where 
manager performance would be rated by their supervisors), the need to avoid self-report 
biases (as independent variables were assessed from managers) and to maintain 
consistency with my justice measurement (based on employees’ perceptions), I chose to 
use employees’ perceptions for core technical performance. In particular, employees 
rated their manager’s core technical performance using the 4-item job dimension of 
Welbourne et al.’s (1998) role-based performance scale. I asked employees to rate, to the 
best of their knowledge, the extent to which the manager is able to meet the core 
technical aspects of his or her role (for example, sales, productivity, other relevant 
performance indicators, meeting top management demands, etc.), in terms of four criteria 
(quantity of work output, quality of work output, accuracy of work, efficiency of work) 
using a 5-point scale (ranging from 1 = “Needs much improvement” to 5 = “Excellent”; α 
= .88).  
Control variables. Due to the varied nature of the sample, I controlled for certain 
factors that can relate to the focal variables in my theoretical model and that might 
provide alternative explanations for any findings. First, I controlled for managers’ span of 




experience higher workloads and also find it harder to ensure that all their employees feel 
fairly treated. I asked managers how many employees directly reported to them and used 
this number as indication of their span of control. Second, I controlled for managers’ 
tenure in their position. This is because individuals who have spent time in a particular 
job position might have learnt to adapt to high workloads and to better manage their 
different responsibilities. Finally, because prioritization of justice might result from 
internal motivation due to importance ascribed to fairness (Greenberg, 1988; Scott et al., 
2009, 2014), I also controlled for managers’ concern with fairness using 4 items adapted 
from Pillutla, Law, and Lee (1997). A sample item was: “It is personally important for 
me that my direct reports see me as a fair leader” (α = .70).  
Confirmatory factor analysis. To examine whether all the measures were 
empirically distinct, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the 7 measures 
(workload, core technical performance, justice performance, prioritization, core technical 
rewards, justice rewards, and fairness concerns) and their respective items. Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Zhang et al., 2014), because the measure of justice performance 
included 20 items, I used the respective dimensions as parcels (cf., Landis, Beal, & 
Tesluk, 2000). Results indicated that the hypothesized, 7-factor measurement model, fit 
the data reasonably well, 2 (N = 389; df = 435) = 922.530, p < .000, CFI = .916, 
RMSEA = .060, SRMR = .056. Chi-square difference tests showed that alternative nested 
models achieved significantly poorer fit. For example, constraining employee rated core 
technical performance and justice performance to load on one factor produced a 
significantly worse fit, ∆2 (N = 389; ∆df = 1) = 146.38, p < .001, CFI = .893, RMSEA = 




to load on one factor produced a significantly worse fit, ∆2 (N = 389; ∆df = 1) = 522.77, 
p < .001, CFI = .834, RMSEA = .084, SRMR = .057). Finally, constraining workload and 
prioritization to load on one factor produced a significantly worse fit, ∆2 (N = 389; ∆df 
= 1) = 325.69, p < .001, CFI = .865, RMSEA = .076, SRMR = .074). These analyses 
provided support for the expected factor structure of the variables. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are displayed in Table 
7. Zero-order correlations suggest that managers’ workload was not significantly 
associated with either core technical or fairness performance. However, there was a 
positive association between managers’ workload and their prioritization of core 
technical tasks over justice tasks (r = .15, p = .002). Furthermore, prioritization was 
negatively (but not significantly) associated with managers’ core technical performance (r 
= -.02, p = .718) and more negatively associated with their justice performance (r = -.15, 
p = .003) as indicated by a test of the difference of correlations (t[389] = -2.92, p < .001). 
Finally, note that the mean for core technical rewards (M = 3.31 [SD = 1.07]) was, on 
average, higher than the mean justice rewards (M = 3.24 [SD = 1.02]; Mdifference = .08 [SD 
= .76], p = .032). This gives some support to my assertion that, on average, organizations 
reward core technical performance more than justice performance.   
To test my hypotheses, I conducted multilevel regression analyses using random 
coefficient modeling (RCM) in R. To clarify again, core technical and justice 
performance are within person variables nested within individual managers. Thus, 
performance was treated as level 1 variable and all other variables as level 2 (the 




suggesting that significant variance in performance was attributed to level 2 (individual 
level) variance. Table 8 presents the results of my regression analysis.  
First, perceived workload was positively related to prioritization of core technical 
tasks (B = .25, p =.001; Table 8, Model 1). Next, because prioritization is a between-
person factor and performance is a within-person factor, a significant interaction between 
prioritization and performance type means that prioritization is differently related to each 
performance type. Indeed, the interaction between prioritization and performance type 
was significant (B = -.08, p =.007; Table 8, Model 4) and is plotted in Figure 5. A simple 
slopes analysis suggested that prioritization was not related to core technical performance 
(B = -.01, p = .717) but was negatively related to justice performance (B = -.10, p = .003). 
I calculated the hypothesized indirect effect of workload on the two types of performance 
via prioritization. This analysis indicated that the unconditional indirect effect of 
workload on core technical performance via prioritization was not significant (95% CI: -
.024, .016), however, the same indirect effect on justice performance was significant 
(95% CI: -.049, -.006). These indirect effects were different from one another (95% CI: 
.007, .071). Note that, as seen in Table 8 (Model 3), the interaction of performance type 
and workload was not significant (B = .03, p = .54), suggesting that workload did not 
have direct effects on core technical and justice performance. These results provide 
partial support for Hypothesis 1.  
As seen in Table 8 (Model 2), the interaction between workload and justice 
rewards was significant (B = -.17, p = .002), supporting Hypothesis 2, which suggested 
that the effect of workload on prioritization is moderated by justice rewards (Figure 6). A 




technical tasks when justice rewards were high (+1SD, B = .06, p = .559) but was 
positively related to prioritization of core technical tasks when justice rewards were low 
(-1SD, B = .41, p < .001).  
To test Hypothesis 3 regarding the moderation of the indirect effect, I compared 
the indirect effect of workload on justice performance and core technical performance 
under high and low levels of justice rewards. As seen in Table 9, supporting Hypothesis 
3, the indirect effect of workload on justice performance via prioritization was negative 
only when justice rewards were low (-1SD, 95% CI: -.070, -.009) and different from the 
indirect effect when justice rewards were high (+1SD, 95% CI: 024, .116). In addition, 
this indirect effect was different from the indirect effect of workload on core technical 
performance via prioritization when justice rewards were low (-1SD, 95% CI: 024, .116).  
Robustness analyses. In line with recommendations by Carlson and Wu (2012) 
to present empirical findings from field data with and without control variables, I re-ran 
the regressions described above excluding all control variables. All significant 
coefficients described above remained significant in this analysis. Additionally, I also 
explored if prioritization was affected by the interaction with core technical rewards. I 
added the interaction between this variable and perceived workload to my analysis in 
three different ways: (a) as a standalone interaction, (b) together with the interaction of 
justice rewards and perceived workload, and (c) as a three-way interaction with perceived 
workload and justice rewards. In all these analysis, this interaction was not significant 
and when justice rewards’ interaction with workload was included in the analysis, this 




Study 3: Discussion 
Study 3 provided further support for my hypotheses, this time with a managerial 
population in a real (as opposed to simulated) setting. Supporting Hypotheses 1, results 
indicated that managers who perceived higher workloads prioritized their core technical 
tasks over justice tasks (or more relational responsibilities) and this prioritization was 
negatively associated with their justice performance as rated by their employees. 
Furthermore, supporting Hypotheses 2 and 3, Study 3 pointed to the role of justice 
rewards in attenuating the differences in the effect of perceived workload on core 
technical and justice performance via prioritization of core technical tasks. Managers who 
perceived strong rewards for justice performance in their organization prioritized core 
technical tasks less in the face of high workloads. Note, in line with distinctions between 
justice and fairness (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; Cropanzano et al., 2015) and consistent with 
Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3 I assessed employees’ perception of managers’ justice rule 
adherence, rather than whether they felt fairly treated. Yet, given the strong evidence that 
such adherence underlies perceptions of overall fair treatment (Ambrose & Schminke, 
2009; Nicklin, McNall, Cerasoli, Strahan, & Cavanaugh, 2014), it seems likely to 
conclude that the perceptions of managers’ behaviors likely translate into judgments of 
fair treatment.  Nonetheless, it would be productive for future research to disentangle any 
possible biases that may lead to differences between justice rule adherence, as reported 




Chapter 7:  General Discussion 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to explore why, despite the many benefits 
associated with fairness, both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that managers do 
not consistently treat employees fairly (Brockner, 2006, 2010). I proposed that in order to 
understand this puzzle, it is important to examine fairness within the wider context of 
managerial job responsibilities. Specifically, I focused my theorizing on two categories of 
tasks that compete for managers’ limited and scarce personal resources: justice tasks, 
representing managers’ relational responsibilities, and core technical tasks. I proposed 
that when facing high workloads, that is, when the personal resources available to 
managers are not sufficient to meet all their tasks, managers are required to prioritize 
between these two tasks. Because of common expectations and reward systems in 
organizational settings as well as people’s general preference to overvalue the completion 
of core technical responsibilities over employee treatment, managers frequently view 
justice tasks as less important to their success as compared to core technical tasks, and 
thus end up deprioritizing the former. As a result, I proposed that workload would be 
more negatively associated with justice tasks than with core technical tasks. I found 
support for my hypotheses across two experimental studies and one field study surveying 
a wide array of managers across multiple industries. Results of my studies suggest that 
managers’ perceived workload was negatively related to their justice performance, more 
so than to their core technical performance. Furthermore, all studies provided evidence 
that when organizations directly reward justice (or at least to the extent that managers 




my paper makes a number of theoretical contributions to the fairness and work demands 
literatures and clarifies a number of fruitful avenues for future research. 
Theoretical Contributions and Directions for Future Research 
Justice rule adherence in the context of managerial jobs. My theory and 
findings highlight how the study of justice as a dependent variable (Brockner et al., 2015; 
Scott et al., 2009) has examined justice in isolation, without considering whether 
managers’ tendencies to act in ways that adhere to rules of justice are shaped by other 
competing tasks. This is important as it suggests that our knowledge of the antecedents of 
justice enactment is restricted to situations where managers’ personal resources are 
sufficient to meet all their work responsibilities. Thus, this paper shifts the focus of 
existing research on justice as a dependent variable to consider other competing 
managerial tasks. This is important as research has already started to establish that justice 
rule adherence is a task that demands substantial personal resources from managers 
(Danziger et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2014; Margolis & Molinsky, 2008).   
As a result of this focus shift, this paper answers calls in the literature to examine 
how the context in which managers operate affect their justice rules adherence. For 
example, Colquitt and Greenberg (2003, p. 187) point out: “… we do not know the 
specific contexts that trigger fair or unfair treatment. Perhaps injustice is more common 
in complex, stressful, or novel contexts.” Echoing this point, Brockner and colleagues 
(Brockner et al., 2009, 2015) also highlight how our understanding of the antecedents of 
justice is limited because research currently does not take into account the fact that 
behaving fairly carries a price for managers, a price that they are not always willing to 




investigations on managerial characteristics (e.g., motivation or personality traits Heslin 
& VandeWalle, 2009; Mayer et al., 2007; Patient & Skarlicki, 2010; Scott et al., 2014) or 
on employee traits or the way these traits are perceived managers (e.g., assertiveness, 
charisma, trustworthiness, need to belong ; Cornelis, Van Hiel, De Cremer, & Mayer, 
2013; Hoogervorst, De Cremer, & van Dijke, 2013; Korsgaard, Roberson, & Rymph, 
1998; Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Zapata et al., 2013; Zhao, Chen, & 
Brockner, 2015), this paper focuses on contextual factors as predictors of justice, 
suggesting that higher perceived workload, frequently caused by more stressful and 
complex contexts (cf., Hambrick et al., 2005) likely makes the opportunity costs 
associated with justice tasks higher than what managers are willing to pay. Using 
resource allocation theory, this paper explains how and why high workloads can 
negatively affect justice adherence via managers’ prioritization decisions.  
Future research can more directly combine prior findings about the characteristics 
of the manager and the employee with the personal resources based view of managerial 
justice as suggested in this paper, to explore whether some characteristics are more or 
less important in situations of scarce or abundant personal resources (cf., Colquitt & 
Greenberg, 2003). Relatedly, research can examine additional individual predictors of 
justice adherence that are specifically important in dealing with high workloads because 
they help increase and maintain personal resources such self-management (Lovelace et 
al., 2007) or time-management (Macan, 1994). 
In addition, this paper also examines how the organizational context (i.e., 
rewards) acts as an antecedent of fairness perceptions via its effects on managers’ 




organizational factors (e.g., work structure) on employees’ fairness perceptions 
(Schminke et al., 2000, 2002), little to no scholarly attention has been devoted to 
explaining how salient organizational factors such as the way managers are evaluated and 
rewarded can affect managers’ fair treatment of employees despite recognition that they 
can create strong situations guiding managers’ behaviors and choices (cf., Bowen & 
Ostroff, 2004). This has important implications because unlike managers’ personal 
characteristics or their relationships with their employees that are known to affect fair 
treatment, managerial workloads and rewards are likely more under the direct control of 
organizations and therefore can be used by organizations to directly manage fairness 
perceptions.   
 In this respect, it is important to note that although my theory suggests that justice 
tasks compete with core technical tasks for scarce resources, my results point to a more 
complex picture of the relationships between these two tasks, workload, justice rewards, 
and performance. Although I found in Study 1 that an increase in justice rewards led to a 
simultaneous increase in justice performance and a decrease in core technical task 
performance, in Studies 2 and 3, higher justice rewards led to increased justice 
performance, without harming core technical performance. In other words, Studies 2 and 
3 seem to suggest that when managers are rewarded for acting justly, not only does their 
justice performance improve, but their core technical performance does not suffer. As 
Study 2 involved more complex tasks that better emulate common managerial situations 
where core technical and justice tasks co-occur and Study 3 was conducted with actual 
managers, these findings raise interesting questions about the possibility that certain 




not harming employees’ fairness perceptions.  
In particular, it is possible that managers inefficiently allocate too many resources 
to core technical tasks under low justice rewards and therefore, when justice rewards are 
higher, core technical tasks are not harmed because personal resources allocated to justice 
tasks do not come at the expense of core technical tasks but from increased efficiency in 
carrying these tasks out. In other words, when justice tasks are not rewarded, managers 
might not only be incentivized to prioritize core technical tasks, but perhaps also over-
incentivized to focus on such tasks, leading them to devote excess personal resources to 
these tasks, over and above what is needed for adequate performance (cf., Holmström & 
Milgrom, 1991; Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), and that could be 
productively used for other relational tasks such as adherence to justice rules. Findings of 
studies 2 and 3 suggest that, managers can “have it all” and maintain core technical 
performance while treating their employs fairly even as workload increases (at least to a 
certain extent). This is consistent with recommendations by practitioners suggesting that 
organizations clearly provide guidance to managers about effective ways to spend 
personal resources across different constitutes and tasks in order to ensure overall 
effectiveness (e.g., Bevans & De Smet, 2013). Rewarding justice might be one way 
provide this sort of guidance. As my studies were not designed to directly test this idea, 
future research could explore it further, because it has important implications in regards 
to ways organizations can facilitate multifaceted managerial performance.  
Additionally, requiring managers to meet both justice and core technical demands 
might introduce costs that are not directly reflected in my theorizing or findings. Such 




additional demands that might cause increased fatigue and burnout. Future research 
should continue to explore the possible “dark side” of rewarding justice tasks in addition 
to core technical tasks. In this respect, studying enhanced roles with regard to including 
justice tasks could reveal an interesting paradox. Although increasing demands and 
creating conflict between roles generally has negative effects, it is possible that 
incorporating more justice demands into managers’ role can actually be beneficial, 
because in contrast to other role, acting justly provides indirect effects on their core 
technical performance by enhancing the contributions of employees who perform better, 
are more proactive and tend to help the manager more. Thus, increasing rewards for 
justice tasks could actually have different effects as compared to increasing rewards for 
other managerial performance requirements (e.g., change, innovation, being a good 
organizational citizen.   
The relative importance ascribed to fairness in organizations. My theory and 
findings suggest a need for a shift in the fairness literature from a discussion of whether 
or not managers view fairness as important, to a discussion of how importantly is fairness 
viewed by managers relative to their other tasks and responsibilities. A number of studies 
have provided evidence that managers care about fairness (or at least the appearance of 
fairness) and believe it to be important for their success (Greenberg, 1990a; Meindl, 
1989; Pepper, Gosling, & Gore, 2015; Scott et al., 2014). Yet, this research has neglected 
to explore the possibility that while fairness is viewed as important when considered in 
isolation, it is not seen as more important than (or at least equally important as) other 
managerial requirements (cf., Cooper & Scandura, 2015). As suggested by my findings, 




becomes more important in understanding managers’ behavior than the absolute levels of 
the importance ascribed to each task. Indeed, in Study 1, people naturally viewed the core 
technical task as more important and relevant for their success as managers than a justice 
task. Even in Study 2, where justice rewards were manipulated to be equal to those 
associated with the core technical task, the relative importance of the justice task in 
comparison to the core technical task was lower than parity. These results are also 
indirectly supported by the findings in Study 3, which suggested that core technical 
rewards were stronger, on average, then justice rewards. This suggests that managers 
come into organizations with a belief about the importance of the two types of tasks, and 
that rewards in organization tend to strengthen their beliefs.  
Although this paper focused on organizational rewards as an important antecedent 
determining the relative importance of each type of task, other personal and 
organizational factors might also affect the evaluation of outcome expectancies 
associated with different tasks, and future research should uncover such factors and their 
relative influence on managers’ beliefs. For instance, justice rewards sway behaviors 
partly because they increase the accountability felt by managers towards such tasks. In 
this way, other factors that might increase managers’ felt accountability towards 
employees, rather than towards other organizational stakeholders, are likely to increase 
the relative importance of treating employees fairly. For example, in organizations or 
industries where certain employees hold considerable power and influence, managers are 
likely to be more attuned to their needs and view the relative importance of acting in just 
way towards them as more important (cf., Blader & Chen, 2012). Another element that 




tasks. Although managers are given discretion when it comes to meeting core technical 
requirements (Spreitzer, 1995), task objectives are usually hierarchically set and 
managers are required to justify the outcomes and the processes used to achieve them. 
Hence, managers have less control over the of time and effort they need to invest to meet 
such requirements (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). On the other hand, managers hold 
considerable discretion over justice rules adherence (Scott et al., 2009). Even if 
organizations implement formal procedures (cf., Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), the 
particular implementation of such formal procedures is usually left to managers (Johnson 
et al., 2014). Therefore, when faced with less available personal resources than is 
demanded by core technical and justice tasks, managers might be more likely able to 
reduce allocation of resources towards justice but are less able to do so when it comes to 
core technical demands.    
Work demands and the multifaceted nature of performance. Finally, this 
paper contributes to the work demands literature. Work demands are aspects of 
individuals’ job or role that act as barriers to goal attainment (e.g., workload; Bakker et 
al., 2014; LePine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 2005). Although organizational performance is 
multifaceted and employees frequently make tradeoffs between different facets of their 
performance (Bergeron, Shipp, Rosen, & Furst, 2011; Rapp et al., 2013), the effects of 
work demands on performance has been mostly explored without taking into account the 
possibility that different performance types might be differently affected by such 
demands (Bakker et al., 2014; Hambrick et al., 2005; LePine et al., 2005). This is 
especially true when it comes to managers (cf., Courtright et al., 2014; Decoster, Stouten, 




are frequently expected to fulfill multiple roles and display a range of behaviors at work 
(Conway, 1999; Yukl, 2012), research has examined the effects of workload and other 
managerial demands on performance broadly defined, neglecting to explore the 
possibility that different aspects of managerial performance are differently affected by the 
experience of demands (cf., Courtright et al., 2014). For instance, Hambrick et al. (2005) 
explicitly exclude from their theorizing about the effects of workload, the possibility that 
executives might, as a result of workload, react to the different types of tasks they face in 
different ways.  
This paper thus advances our knowledge on the differential effects that work 
demands (e.g., workload) have on multiple aspects of managerial performance and sheds 
light on the mechanisms underlying managers’ choices of which responsibilities to 
(de)prioritize. Although no managerial tradeoff is inherently wrong, by focusing on 
rewards and outcome expectancies as predictors of prioritization (cf., Schmidt & DeShon, 
2007) my theorizing and findings suggest that when faced with high workloads, in the 
absence of clear rewards about justice from the organization, managers are likely to 
under-prioritize justice tasks in comparison to core technical tasks. Given the documented 
benefits of fairness, and the complexity of the managerial role and its relationship with 
organizational outcomes (Conway, 1999; Yukl, 2008) one might question whether this 
type of prioritization is the most effective choice for all managers in all organizations (cf., 
Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). My intention is not to argue that managers should 
prioritize their justice tasks more than their core technical tasks or that organizations 
should reward performance on such tasks more. Although the possible benefits of treating 




choices about prioritization and rewards depend on the specific circumstances of each 
case. However, these are choices that managers make and thus it is important for both 
managers and organizations to make them intentionally while recognizing their 
implications. Future research could further highlight when and why different rewards 
structures are likely to have a greater effect on organizational outcomes.  
Limitations 
Although I found support for my theoretical model across three studies, the 
inferences one can draw from my findings are limited in several ways. First, in respect to 
Studies 1 and 2, the samples and nature of the simulations used and might limit the 
generalizability of the findings. Second, because Study 3 was a cross-sectional survey, it 
does not provide evidence of causation, only of correlation between the variables 
examined. Furthermore, in Study 3, both core technical and justice performance were 
rated by only one of the managers’ employees. Ratings of one individual subordinate 
might not adequately represent managers’ behaviors due to idiosyncratic biases. 
Although this is a possibility, there is evidence that employees tend to develop shared 
perceptions of their managers’ adherence to justice rules (Mayer et al., 2007; Roberson & 
Williamson, 2012). Relatedly, employees are probably not the most appropriate 
organizational actors to evaluate managerial core technical performance (as opposed to 
top management). Having more objective performance ratings or at least measuring core 
technical task performance from the top management’s perspective would have provided 
greater validity to these findings. However, the combination of the experimental method 
in Studies 1 and 2 with the more generalizable sample assessed in Study 3 and the 




undergraduate students, managers and employees across a variety of industries and jobs) 
and designs improves confidence in my findings.  
Importantly, my theory treated justice broadly, without considering whether 
certain justice rules might require more or less time and effort. A case in point is the 
consistency rule (part of procedural justice), which states that: “allocative procedures 
should be consistent across persons and over time” (Leventhal, 1980, p. 40). If managers 
consistently apply the same rules to all employees, they might save time and effort. 
Indeed, a common coping strategy for dealing with workload is the utilization of familiar 
responses (Barnes & Van Dyne, 2009; Hambrick et al., 2005). However, although 
consistency can be easy to implement, in some cases it might still require managers to 
consider whether circumstances have changed in a way that warrants a different decision 
criteria (cf., Blader & Rothman, 2014). Future research should devote attention to the 
effects of workload on adherence to different justice rules and the development of more 
nuanced theory separating the effects of workload on certain aspects of justice.   
Additionally, my studies do not adequately address the fact that many of the 
theorized processes occur over time. For example, there might be variance in the amount 
of workload that is placed on the manager over time (Ilies et al., 2015) and thus managers 
might compensate for lack of justice or core technical performance at certain periods by 
engaging in more justice rules adherence (or more core technical task work) in other 
periods. More longitudinal and within-person research designs are needed to explore such 
questions in more detail. Finally, all of my samples were drawn from the U.S. thus 
limiting the inferences regarding cross-cultural generalizability of my findings (cf., Shao, 




importance ascribed to justice tasks differs across cultures and whether such beliefs 
translate to different prioritization decisions by managers.   
Finally, the theory and findings of this paper highlight situations under which 
justice is hindered as a result of resource scarcity and workload. My findings highlight 
how organizations might be able to put in place rewards systems to ensure that justice is 
not disregarded. However, in most of my empirical studies, justice was not enhanced. 
Future research could focus on contextual factors that can potentially not only prevent 
non-adherence to rules of justice but can also enhance it. One promising line of research 
lies in a recent distinction, or rather the continuum, of just and unjust actions, which 
seems to have different relationships with outcomes and might have differing antecedents 
as well (Colquitt, Long, Rodell, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 2015). 
Practical Implications 
With the above limitations in mind, this paper offers a number of practical 
implications. Most importantly, my theorizing suggests that the responsibility for treating 
employees fairly should not be placed only on individual managers, but that 
organizational leaders need to think more broadly about whether and how they are 
creating work environments that guide managers to act (un)fairly. In this respect, my 
findings echo Brockner’s (2006, 2010) assertion that making sure managers act fairly 
starts at the top. Organizations should probably monitor managers’ perceived workload. 
Although it is unlikely that organizations could completely eliminate such demands or 
their depleting effects, balancing such demands and taking steps to reduce unnecessary 
constraints and hassles (Bakker et al., 2014) seem to be plausible ways to reduce some of 




celebrating managers who devote time, attention, and energy, despite workload, to act 
fairly (i.e., adhere to justice rules), could counteract at least some of the negative effects 
brought about by workload, perhaps without hurting core technical performance. In fact, 
given the organizational benefits of fairness, it might behoove organizations not to leave 
prioritization decisions to managers’ interpretation. Organizations that take specific steps 
to prioritize fairness by explicitly including relational aspects as predictors of managerial 
evaluations and rewards, might be able to more effectively reap the benefits associated 
with fair treatment. Taken more generally, my theory and findings suggest that 
organizations should carefully consider managers’ roles and how managerial rewards 
influence the way managers perceive these roles (Katz & Khan, 1978). In some 
organizational contexts, it might be highly beneficial to review how factors such as 
rewards and other signals (i.e., role modeling) affect managers’ prioritization of different 





Chapter 8:  Conclusion  
 
 
Fair treatment of employees is important for those being treated as well as for the 
organizations employing them. Yet, even though managers recognize the importance of 
fair treatment, anecdotal and empirical evidence of unfair treatment in organizational 
settings is still abundant. In this dissertation, my aim was to try and explain this puzzle. 
My theory and findings suggest that, at least in part, the discrepancy between the overall 
importance ascribed to fair treatment and its implementation in everyday organizational 
life can be better understood when taking a holistic view of the context in which 
managers operate, their workload, other competing tasks, and the way they are rewarded. 
This requires a shift in the fairness literature from a study of fairness in isolation to a 
study of fairness in relation to other important managerial roles and demands. My hope is 
that this paper provides the foundation for fairness scholars to continue theorizing about 








Appendix A1: Core Technical and Justice Tasks (Study 1) 
Answering a client complaint  
One of ENS’ major clients, VV Industries, complained that they were overcharged for 
services rendered on transaction 1555. ENS billed them $20,000, but to date, VV 
Industries has paid only $10,000, claiming that this settles their debt. Issues like this 
sometime arise when clients request changes to the original, agreed upon plan, after 
implementation has begun and this doesn't get properly incorporated in the billing 
system. Unless the contract with the client states otherwise, ENS charges every requested 
change based on a pre-determined rate.  
 
Over the last few weeks you gathered all relevant information about the compliant (see 
your notes below). You have determined that VV Industries' complaint was partly 
justified.  
 
Your task is to write VV industries an email to settle this issue. At a bare minimum, 
you need to communicate to VV Industries the amount they still owe us. Beyond this, 
you need to decide how to frame the message to ensure ENS keeps its good relationship 
with this major client. A well-crafted message includes: 
(a) a detailed explanation of how we handled their complaint  
(b) a clear explanation of what we discovered (be specific about amounts)  
(c) a proper apology for any mistakes on our side 







Communicating a personnel decision to an employee 
Over the last few weeks, you were considering promoting one of two employees, Alex 
Goni or Taylor Tanor. Alex and Taylor were very close in their ranking on the official 
criteria used to make promotion decisions in ENS (i.e., tenure, technical knowledge, and 
performance). In the end, the decision came down to your judgment call as a manager 
regarding who is more deserving of a promotion and you decided to go with Taylor. It is 
now time to inform them. 
  
You have already sent an email to Taylor. Your task now is to write an email to Alex, 
the employee who was not promoted. At a bare minimum, the email should inform Alex 
of the actual decision. Beyond this, you need to decide what further information to add 
that might help Alex better accept the decision. A well-crafted message includes: 
(a) an explanation of the process used to make the decision 
(b) a justification for your final decision 
(c) specific examples of Alex’s behaviors justifying the decision 
(d) showing empathy and respect for Alex’s situation and showing appreciation to keep 
Alex’s motivation high. 
  
Below are some of the notes you had in the employees’ personnel file as of the 









Appendix A2: Example Response and Coding Scheme (Study 1) 
Core Technical Task Response and Coding Guidelines 
Code Guidelines Examples 
0 Wrote nothing  
1 Just stating the decision 
without any further 
explanation 
 "Dear client, I'm contacting you in regards to your contract with ENS. Firstly, I'd like to apologize for the 
confusion regarding the amount due on 
  VW Industries, I am sorry for the confusion in the billing of our services, and for any inconvenience this 
may have caused.  I have reviewed the situation and would like to work with you to resolve the issues.  
Please know ENS is concerned with your matter and wish to make the situation right by you. We wish to 
2 A bit more of an explanation, 
one of the other required 
issues appears (e.g., 
procedures used)  
 Thank you for taking the time to inform us of your concerns. Unless there is a contract that specifies 
otherwise, ENS uses a default rate to bill customers. We have no record of a contract between VV 
industries and ENS stating different rates. If you have a copy of the contract then we would very much like 
a copy so we can resolve this as soon as possible. At this time our records show you owe us an additional 
10,000. 
3 Contains some parts and 
elaborates on them, but not 
all. Does not have to be 
accurate (i.e., can say you 
owe us 20,000) but there 
must be other aspects in the 
email which are correct. 
Alternatively, includes all 
required parts but doesn’t go 
into detail in the 
explanations   
 Your business relationship with us is very valuable to us, and I deeply regret any confusion that has 
occurred during this billing dispute. After consulting with my contraction specialist, Jordan Mahar, I have 
found that due to an error on our part, we have sent you what seems to be a default bill. This means you are 
correct in your assessment that the existing contract is for $10,000, which you have already paid. I hope we 
will be able to continue doing business together in the future, and I thank you for choosing ENS. 
 Dear Sir or Madam: I regret the recent conflict that our two firms are facing regarding payment for the 
recent completed project.  I have done an investigation, which included reviewing notes from conversations 
with four different people who were involved in the project.  On behalf of our firm, I apologize as it seems 
we made a clerical error.  This seems to be the main reason there was a misunderstanding.  In fairness, your 
payment of $10,000 is hereby deemed sufficient and no further payment is expected. We look forward to 
future projects between our firms. Sincerely 
4 Good answer overall, seems 
to touch on most, if not all 
required parts. Uses 
information from the “case.” 
Includes a clear apology and 
explanation of what 
happened. Is correct in 
amount requested (including 




 Hello Devin, After a thorough investigation into the issue you raised in your email to me, I believe I have 
located the source of the discrepancy. I communicated with our ENS internal departments regarding the 
differential between the amount paid to date by VV, and the balance we had invoiced. After speaking with 
our accounting and contracting departments, I believe you are correct in your interpretation of the contract. 
I located the original executed agreement and the verbiage specifically states that al changes to the 
deliverable are included in the overall price of $10,000, the balance paid by VV. As a result, I offer my 
sincerest apologies for the miscommunication we had, and I have removed the outstanding balance to 
reflect your account being paid n full. I appreciate your efforts and patience in resolving the issue and look 




Code Guidelines Examples 
 
5 Includes all parts, including 
explanation about process of 
investigation or details about 
who they talked with], must 
talk about 3000$, polite and 
the entire email flows and 
makes sense. Must be correct 
about amount owed in terms 
of main payment [can say 
they give up on the $3000 
for some valid reason]. 
 Devin, Have reviewed the specifics of transaction #1555 with the appropriate parties here at ENS, the main 
issue seems to be a clerical record on our side, looks like we recorded at $20,000 default rate, which is the 
default rate if a specific contract has not been recorded for a particular job transaction.  In other words, we 
(incorrectly) assumed a default 20K rate on T1555 when in fact the actual price should have been $10,000 
plus an additional incentive rate of $3,000 for completing the project on time (total contract of $13,000).  At 
the end of the day, we simply made a clerical error, albeit a material one, and I profusely apologize for the 
mistake. After thorough research, the corrected amount due is actually $3,000, which is $13,0000 - the 
previously paid $10,000 that VV sent over.  The remaining balance ($3k) is the contractually specified 
bonus due for completing the project on time.  In this case, it seems the bonus was warranted as a large 
number of last minute changes were applied to the project. As I said earlier, I sincerely apologize for the 
contract billing error, and we have taken steps on our side to correct the error so that this does not occur 
again in the future.  Please feel free to call me at 555-555-5555 ext 55 if you have ANY further issues or 
concerns.   If you could forward this to your folks in VV accounting for payment of the final $3,000 (the 
bonus portion due ENS) we can put this matter to rest.   Let me know if you have further questions, and as 
always, thanks for your business and support - we truly value our relationship with VV. 
 
 Justice Task Response and Coding Guidelines 
Code Guidelines Examples 
0 Wrote nothing  
1 Just stating the decision 
without any further 
explanation. 
 Dear Alex, I am writing to let you know that, although I appreciate your interest in the promotion we 
discussed, and consider you to be an exemplary employee and good candidate, we decided that the timing 
is just not right for you right now, and we will be moving in another direction. I know that there will be 
other opportunities in the coming months, and trust that  y 
2 A bit more information, at 
least one required part 
appears (e.g., “regret to 
inform”)  
 Dear Alex Goni, I regret to inform you that we have chosen another employee as the recipient of the 
promotion. Your hard work ethics are highly appreciated. It was overall an extremely hard decision to 
make as you were a top contender. There shall be man other opportunities for promotions, so keep up the 
good work! Sincerely, ENS 
3 Contains some parts and 









 Alex, I regret to inform you that we will not be able to promote you at this time.  While discussing your 
productivity with other managers, we felt that this was not the right time.  We have been very impressed 
with your production, but feel that a few areas could be improved to further advance your professional 
career.  While your teamwork has been strong, a number of members have felt conflicts while working 
with you, so we need to resolve some of those issues.  Also, there was another project that your kills would 




Code Guidelines Examples 
 
4 Good answer overall, seems 
to touch on most, if not all 
required parts.  
 Hi Alex, I just wanted to touch base with you regarding a very tough decision that I had to recently make. I 
have decided to promote Taylor. This was a very difficult decision, but Taylor has over the past year been 
able to take on more responsibility within the company and has been a slightly stronger asset for the 
company than you have. I understand that you have been going through some difficult times over the past 
year which might have made it more difficult for you to step up and assume more responsibility, and I am 
completely sympathetic to that reality. I want you to know that I truly value you as a top performer and a 
huge asset to the company, and I am very thankful to have you as part of our team. Keep doing a great job, 
and if there are any opportunities to volunteer in the future where you can step up and take on a little more 
responsibility, go for it! Let me know when you have a few minutes to meet so I can more fully explain 
my thought process to you in coming to this decision, and we can build a game plan for you for the future. 
Thanks, BF 
5 Well  developed and well 
written, contains every 
required part fully (i.e., not 
just mention it) and includes 
examples and information 
from the “case” 
 Dear Alex, Thank you so much for your enthusiasm and interest in the potential promotion. We truly had a 
difficult choice to make and incredibly qualified candidates to choose from.  Ultimately, we've decided to 
offer Taylor the promotion. During this difficult decision, we considered factors such as tenure, technical 
knowledge, and performance. While the decision was close, we ultimately felt that Taylor was more 
invested in the company, offering to take on additional work.  Recently, we've felt that there have been 
several opportunities that aligned well with your talents that you opted not to take on. For instance, we 
were disappointed to see that you did not volunteer for the Remington Steel Inc. Project, despite being 
your area of expertise.  We understand that there are several personal issues in your life at the moment and 
we empathize with you entirely. However, we don't feel it would be appropriate to add to your workload 
with a promotion at this time. Ultimately, we would love to keep you on in your current role and see you 
continue to work hard and display a high level of performance.  If we see an improvement in your desire to 
take on new projects and your commitment to the company, we would absolutely love to consider you for 
future promotion. Again, this was a terribly difficult decision that came down to minor differences. You 
are a hugely talented employee and an asset to our company.  We hope you'll continue to be so in the 





Appendix B1: Core Technical and Justice Tasks (Study 2) 
Completing an official proposal for the new client acquisition role 
You have been working on an innovative proposal for a new position devoted to 
obtaining new clients. You plan to promote either Alex or Taylor to this new role, which 
will likely develop into a leadership role. For your proposal to go through, your boss, Jess 
Gold, must be convinced that the extra costs (in terms of higher salary, benefits, and extra 
work space) are worth the benefits. Jess is skeptical, but agreed that if you write a good 
proposal, it will considered in the top-managements’ budgeting meeting next week. 
Your task is to write (in the appropriate textbox below) a short proposal 
addressed to Jess. Your goal is to convince Jess that the new role should be 
created. At a bare minimum, the proposal needs to highlight the possible benefits of 
the new role and recommend a person for the role (i.e., Taylor or Alex). Beyond this, 
you need to decide what information to include and how to craft a clear and convincing 
message. A well-crafted message will include:  
1. A detailed explanation of the process used to create the proposal (for example, what 
information you used, what are your assumptions, etc.) 
2. A clear explanation of the expected costs of the new role 
3. A comparison of the proposed role to similar roles with our competitors 
4. How the employee you have recommend for the position fits the requirements 
 
You MUST send your proposal in writing to Jess today. 
 
Informing an employee about your decision 
You are considering promoting either Taylor Tanor or Alex Goni to the new role. Both 
are eligible and expect the promotion. As the proposal must name the specific employee, 
you need to let the employee who you do NOT choose about the decision. 
Your task is to write (in the appropriate textbox below) a message to the person 
you decided NOT to promote for the new role. As this person will keep working with 
you, your goal is to make sure they take the decision well and keep motivated. At a 
bare minimum, the message should inform this employee of the decision. Beyond 
this, you need to decide what further information to add that might help this employee 
better accept the decision. A well-crafted message will include:  
1. An explanation of the process used to make the decision (what did you review, who 
or which information did you consult, etc.) 
2. A clear justification of your final decision (that is, give the logic and 
reasoning, explain what criteria you used to make the decision, if possible 
provide concrete examples) 
3. Careful wording and language to make sure the message is sensitive to the fact that 
this person is receiving bad news 
4. Appreciation for the employee’s past work in ENS and directions of how 
the employee can improve for possible future promotions  
 




Appendix B2: Example of Highly Scored Responses (Study 2) 
Examples of highly scored responses on the core technical task 
“The process I have used to create the proposal was to look at each and every detail about 
both employees. I used personal comments I have about each one, quotes from client 
satisfaction surveys, employee performance summaries for the year, and a cost-benefit 
analysis. My choice is to choose Taylor for the position. This is under the assumption that 
Taylor will rise up to the occasion and bring their great interpersonal skills when dealing 
with new clientele. By promoting Taylor, the cost will be $40000 for setup costs in the 
first year. Yearly costs for the first 2-4 years are $25,000 if the success is mild, and with 
great success could reach $220,000. In the first year with Taylor, I anticipate a $100,000 
additional revenue, followed by $130,000 in the next 2-4 years and $500,000 in the years 
to come. Our competitors have setup similar roles with varying degrees of success that I 
have carefully examined. Competitors B and C have both created this role and are each 
tasting success from the position. C has reaped more benefits from it, but B has definitely 
had gains from it as well. Competitor A, who is most similar to us as a company, decided 
not to make this decision but after my analysis I think it was an unwise decision on their 
part. This implementation of the new role could give us an advantage over Competitor A 
that we've been needing. The reason I chose Taylor is because Taylor has great 
interpersonal skills which is the most important skill in the short-term life of this role. 
What Taylor might lack in technical specialties and tenure, Taylor can more than make 
up for in the long-run. With this promotion, Taylor would obviously immediately 
undergo training programs that would increase Taylor's technical skills and also help 
raise conscientiousness which has been a slight issue in the past. What Taylor doesn't 
need is training to be a personal salesperson who can get the job done. Being sociable 
will not only help Taylor with clients, but will help when there…” 
 
“I believe it would be in our best interests to create the client acquisition role and to 
promote Taylor Tanor to this position. I completed a full analysis on the new position by 
performing a cost-benefit analysis, looking at employee performance and feedback on the 
two potential hires, and analyzing competitors who created similar positions. By 
promoting Taylor, you are getting an excellent worker who co-workers have nothing but 
good things to say about, and at a lower cost than if you were to hire Alex Because of 
Taylor's shorter tenure and lower salary, expected setup and yearly costs will be lower by 
$10,000 and $15,000-$30,000 (depending on success), respectively, but we think she can 
provide the same additional revenue that Alex would ($100,000 in ear 1, $130,000 with 
mild success years 2-4, and $500,000 with great success years 2-4). Although Alex has 
more expertise, Taylor's social skills will allow her to gain and keep new clients for our 
business. I would recommend that if the position has success and is expanded to a team 
down the road, Alex could be added to provide advice while Taylor handles most of the 
client interaction. We determined that the role requirements show that selling abilities are 
most important in year one, and one client was quoted as saying, "somehow Taylor 
always finds ways to sell us more services," among other raving reviews. We think that 
clients would be drawn to Taylor's personality and she could help us to win over clients 




ago and has helped to increase average profit per client by 3%. They are half the size of 
ENS, so if we can make this same 3% increase it would lead to even higher profits for us. 
Competitor B is 1.5 times our size and has a 4-person department, so we could aim to 
have about 3 people on the team in 2 years’ time. With the right person in the role and the 
proper development of it based on analysis of competitor's, we this…” 
 
Examples of highly scored responses on the justice task 
“Dear Alex, 
After carefully considering both you and other ENS employees for our new role, we want 
to let you know how much we appreciate all that your do for ENS and all of your 
successes thus far. However, for this particular position, we do not feel that you are the 
best fit.   In order to make our decision, we reviewed technical backgrounds, particular 
areas of expertise possessed by each candidate, the quantity of new business each 
candidate has gained for us in the past, as well as the quality of work performed by each 
candidate. As this position will also develop into a leadership role, we very heavily 
considered our personal experiences as well as the testimonials of others who had worked 
with each candidate, gaining insight into working habits, personalities, priorities, and 
leadership styles of each candidate.   After considering both quantitative and qualitative 
information on all candidates, we decided to choose the candidate with the most 
extroverted personality, and the strongest leadership experience, ranking 85 and above on 
their 360 degree score. We believe the role of gaining new business will require an 
individual able to make others feel comfortable and assured, while inspiring their team. 
While you have excellent technical skills, 13 specialties in particular, and have helped 
grow our business as a highly dedicated and appreciated team member, we would love to 
give you more time to develop your leadership skills for future roles, as your scores 
tended to fall below 80. In the future, we would love for you to take more opportunities 
to help the team and therefore, help ENS by contributing your knowledge and skills. We 
would also love to see you continue to interact with clients, and to develop positive 
relations in order to enhance their experiences and promote our services.  Thank you for 
your time and we hope to continue to grow with you in the future!”  
 
“Hello Alex,   
I am sorry to bring you this news, but it has been decided that you will stay in your 
current position and not be promoted. You are a very strong employee at the ENS 
company and we firmly believe that you will do better in your current position. Your 
tenure is very impressive and you are a very valuable asset to ENS.  This decision was 
very difficult. I analyzed our Employee Performance Summary from 2015 as well as 
satisfaction surveys. The Employee Performance Summary took into account tenure in 
months, number of technical specialties, yearly performance rankings, and 360 score. 
While you are an excellent candidate in all of these areas, your current role tailors to your 
skillful, intelligent nature.   One of the main parts of this new position is being able to 
talk to people. As you know, ENS prides itself on treating its employees with respect and 
fairness. We like all employees to be informed of all decisions made to be transparent as 
possible. While you do hold the intellect, this position needs someone who is confident in 
speaking with others. As a result, we do firmly believe that you are the best at your 




to talk to your coworkers more and take some social initiatives. Feel free to come to 
speak to me more about this.   You are truly valued here at ENS. You have been an 
integral part of making our company the great empire that it is. I hope that you continue 











Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors of Performance Across Conditions (Study 1) 
Workload Performance 




 M SE  M SE 
Low (n = 122) .14a .09  .31a .09 
      
High (n = 111) -.16b .09  -.34b .09 
Note. N = 233; Means represent standardized scores. Means with no superscripts in common within performance type differ 







Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables (Study 2) 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Workload conditiona .49 .50 -     
2. Justice rewards conditionb  .49 .50 .00 -    
3. Prioritization of core technical task over justice task 3.15 1.08 .09 -.24** -   
4. Core technical performance  1.73 .94 -.25** -.01 .03 -  
5. Justice performance  2.78 1.00 -.30** .19** -.34** .35** - 
Note. N = 239. 
a 0 – low, 1 – high b 0 – low, 1 – high 





Regression Analysis Predicating Prioritization of Core Technical Task and Core Technical and Justice Performance (Study 2)  










 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Level 2 (Individual Level) N= 239           
Intercept .18** .05 .12* .06 .18 .10 .24 .12 .24 .13 
Workload Condition (WL)a .12 .06 .26** .09 -.50** .13 -.46** .18 -.48** .18 
Justice Rewards (JR)b -.28** .06 -.14 .09 .14 .10 .01 .18 .02 .17 
WL*JR   -.28* .12   -.05 .25 -.03 .25 
Prioritization of core technical task over 
justice task (PRIO) 
    .06 .06   
.05 .07 
Level 1 (Performance Level)           
Performance Type (PT)c     .02 .10 -.01 .14 .00 .14 
PT*WL     -.03 .14 -.39 .21 -.25 .20 
PT*JR       .11 .20 .04 .20 
PT*Wl*JR       .58* .29 .42 .28 
PT*PRIO     -.36** .07   -.32** .07 
Pseudo-R2d .05 .06 .05 .05 .05 
Note. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates with standard errors; All continuous variables were 
standardized  
a Dummy coded: 0 – low, 1 – high b Dummy coded: 0 – low, 1 – high c Dummy coded: 0 – core technical, 1 – justice d Based 
on formulas suggested by Kreft and De Leeuw (1998) and Singer (1998), Pseudo R2 is calculated as the sum of the total 
variance attributable to within and between variance components 





Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors of Performance across Conditions (Study 2) 
Workload Justice Rewards Performance 




  M SE  M SE 
Low (n = 121) Low (N = 61) .24a .13  .23a .12 
       
 High  (N = 60) .24a .13  .35a .12 
       
High (n = 118) Low (N = 59) -.23b .13  -.62b .12 
       
 High (N = 59) -.27b .13  .03a .12 
Note. N = 233; Means represent standardized scores. Means with no superscripts in common within performance type differ 






Comparison of Indirect Effects of Workload Condition via Prioritization on Core Technical and Justice Performance at 
Different level of Rewards Condition (Study 2) 
Indirect effect of workload 
condition (low  high) via 
prioritization on: 
95% CI of indirect effect at:   95% CI of difference 
between indirect effects: Low justice 
rewards condition 
 High justice 
rewards condition 
 
Core Technical Performance  -.02, .01  -.02, .01  -.03, .05 
      
Justice Performance -.14, -.02  -.04, .06  .02, .14 
 
Note. Table entries represent 95% confidence intervals (CI) of Monte Carlo-based simulations with 20,000 random draws of 
the indirect effects of workload condition on the two types of performance via prioritization at different justice rewards 
conditions. Significant indirect effects are shown in boldface. In the low justice rewards condition, the 95% confidence 
intervals of indirect effect on justice performance excluded 0, suggesting in this condition, workload condition was negatively 






Exploratory Factor Analysis of Prioritization of Core Technical Tasks over Justice Tasks, Justice Rewards, and Core 




 Core Technical  
Rewards 
 Prioritization 
Being productive or getting things done 0.23  0.78  0.02 
Meeting individual productivity requirements in terms of quantity (e.g., 














Meeting specific individual goals set by upper management 0.47  0.58  -0.03 
Appropriately rewarding or recognizing our employees based on their 






Allowing our employees to express their views, feelings, and concerns 






Sharing information with our employees in a candid, thorough, and 






Treating our employees with dignity, respect, and politeness  0.71  0.39  -0.24 
Treating our employees fairly 0.85  0.27  -0.21 
Prioritizing getting things done over treating my employees fairly -0.10  0.00  0.76 
Focusing on reaching financial/customer related goals or milestones 






Focusing primarily on completing immediate task goals at the cost of 






Making sure that my team and I meet our short-term goals even if it 






Eigenvalue  3.11  2.78  2.38 
% Variance explained 23.91%  21.28%  18.31% 





Means, Standard deviations, and Correlations of Variables (Study 3) 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Manager’s position tenure   6.35 6.48 -                 
2. Manager’s span of control  11.33 16.29 -.06 -               
3. Manager’s fairness concerns  4.21 .71 .07 -.02 -             
4. Manager’s perceived 
workload 
3.45 .56 -.04 -.01 .14** -           
5. Manager’s prioritization of 
core technical tasks over 
fairness tasks 
2.74 .87 -.02 -.03 -.19** .15** -         
6. Justice rewards  3.24 1.02 .09 -.08 -.01 -.01 -.11* -       
7. Core technical rewards 3.32 1.07 .15** -.10 .06 .03 -.07 .74** -     
8. Employee rated fairness 
performance  
4.27 .54 .04 -.11* .05 .04 -.15** .08 .10 -   
9. Employee rated core 
technical performance 
4.43 .63 -.04 -.08 .00 .01 -.02 .00 .01 .60** - 
Note. N = 389.  







Regression Analysis Predicating Prioritization of Core Technical Tasks and Core Technical and Justice Performance (Study 
3)  








 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
Level 2 (Manager Level) N= 389         
Intercept 2.41** .04 2.41** .04 4.43** .03 4.43** .03 
Position tenure   .00 .01 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Span of control .00 .00 .00 .00 -.003* .00 -.003* .00 
Fairness concerns -.30** .05 -.31** .05 .02 .04 .00 .04 
Core technical rewards .03 .06 .03 .06 .03 .04 .03 .04 
Justice Rewards (JR) -.08 .06 -.09 .06 .00 .04 .00 .04 
Perceived workload (WL) .25** .08 .24** .08 .00 .06 .01 .06 
WL*JR   -.17* .07     
Prioritization of core technical tasks over justice tasks (PRIO)       -.01 .04 
Level 1 (Performance Level)         
Performance Type (PT)a     -.17** .03 -.17** .03 
PT*WL     .03 .05 .05 .05 
PT*PRIO       -.08** .03 
Pseudo-R2b .07 .08 .02 .02 
Note. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates with standard errors. All variables (except dependent 
variable) were mean centered  
a Dummy coded: 0 – core technical, 1 – justice b Based on formulas suggested by Kreft and De Leeuw (1998) and Singer 
(1998), Pseudo R2 is calculated as the sum of the total variance attributable to within and between variance components 





Comparison of Indirect Effects of Perceived Workload via Prioritization on Core Technical and Justice Performance at Low 
and High levels of Justice Rewards (Study 3) 
 
Indirect effects of perceived 
workload via prioritization on: 
95% CI of indirect effect at low 
and high levels of justice rewards: 
95% CI of difference 
between indirect effects: 
 -1SD: Low  +1SD: High  
Core Technical Performance -.036, .022  -.009, .014 -.001, .061 
     
Justice Performance -.070, -.009  -.015, .032 024, .116 
 
Note. Table entries represent 95% confidence intervals (CI) of Monte Carlo-based simulations with 20,000 random draws of 
the indirect effects of perceived workload on the two types of performance via prioritization at low and high levels of justice 
rewards. Significant indirect effects are shown in boldface. When justice rewards were low (-1SD), the 95% confidence 
intervals of indirect effect on justice performance excluded 0, suggesting that under low justice rewards perceived workload 






















Figure 3. Interaction between prioritization and performance type to predict (standardized) performance (Study 2). 
Performance was a within person variable and was standardized. The interaction depicts the different relationships between 
prioritization and performance for each performance type. In particular, although prioritization was not related to performance 






Figure 4. Interaction between workload and rewards condition to predict (standardized) prioritization of the core technical task 






Figure 5. Interaction between prioritization and performance type to predict performance (Study 3). Performance was a within 
person variable. The interaction depicts the different relationships between prioritization and performance for each 
performance type. In particular, although prioritization was not related to performance on the core technical task (B = -.01, p = 







Figure 6. Interaction between managers’ perceived workload and justice rewards to predict prioritization of core technical 






Abele, A. E., & Wojciszke, B. (2007). Agency and communion from the perspective of self 
versus others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(5), 751–763. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.751 
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 
62, 267–299. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ambrose, M. L., & Schminke, M. (2009). The role of overall justice judgments in organizational 
justice research: A test of mediation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(2), 491–500. 
doi:10.1037/a0013203 
Anseel, F., Lievens, F., & Schollaert, E. (2009). Reflection as a strategy to enhance task 
performance after feedback. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
110(1), 23–35. 
Ashford, S. J., Blatt, R., & VandeWalle, D. (2003). Reflections on the looking glass: A review of 
research on feedback-seeking behavior in organizations. Journal of Management, 29(6), 
773–799. doi:10.1016/S0149-2063 
Ashford, S. J., & Tsui, A. S. (1991). Self-regulation for managerial effectiveness: The role of 
active feedback seeking. Academy of Management Journal, 34(2), 251–280. 
doi:10.2307/256442 




does it really matter? Personnel Psychology, 51(3), 577–598. doi:10.1111/j.1744-
6570.1998.tb00252.x 
Avolio, B. J., Sosik, J. J., Jung, D. I., & Berson, Y. (2003). Leadership models, methods, and 
applications. (W. C. Borman, D. R. Ilgen, R. J. Kilmoski, & I. B. Weiner, Eds.)Handbook 
of Psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. doi:10.1002/0471264385.wei1212 
Bakker, A. B., & Demerouti, E. (2007). The job demands-resources model: State of the art. 
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 22(3), 309–328. doi:10.1108/02683940710733115 
Bakker, A. B., Demerouti, E., & Sanz-Vergel, A. I. (2014). Burnout and work engagement: The 
JD–R approach. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational 
Behavior, 1(1), 389–411. doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091235 
Barnes, C. M., Hollenbeck, J. R., Wagner, D. T., DeRue, D. S., Nahrgang, J. D., & Schwind, K. 
M. (2008). Harmful help: The costs of backing-up behavior in teams. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 93(3), 529–539. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.3.529 
Barnes, C. M., Lucianetti, L., Bhave, D. P., & Christian, M. S. (2014). You wouldn’t like me 
when I'm sleepy: Leader sleep, daily abusive supervision, and work unit engagement. 
Academy of Management Journal. doi:10.5465/amj.2013.1063 
Barnes, C. M., & Van Dyne, L. (2009). “I”m tired’: Differential effects of physical and 
emotional fatigue on workload management strategies. Human Relations, 62(1), 59–92. 
doi:10.1177/0018726708099518 
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2007). Self-regulation, ego depletion, and motivation. Social 





Beal, D. J., Weiss, H. M., Barros, E., & MacDermid, S. M. (2005). An episodic process model of 
affective influences on performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(6), 1054–1068. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1054 
Bergeron, D. M. (2007). The potential paradox of organizational citizenship behavior: Good 
citizens at what cost? Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1078–1095. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.2007.26585791 
Bergeron, D. M., Shipp, A. J., Rosen, B., & Furst, S. A. (2011). Organizational citizenship 
behavior and career outcomes: The cost of being a good citizen. Journal of Management. 
doi:10.1177/0149206311407508 
Bevans, F., & De Smet, A. (2013). Making time management the organization’s priority. 
McKinsey Quarterly, (January), 1–17. 
Bies, R. J. (2013). The delivery of bad news in organizations: A framework for analysis. Journal 
of Management, 39(1), 136–162. doi:10.1177/0149206312461053 
Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. S. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication criteria for fairness. In B. 
H. Sheppard (Ed.), Research on negotiation in organizations (pp. 43–55). Greenwich, CT: 
JAI Press. 
Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y.-R. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice 
perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(5), 994–1014. 
doi:10.1037/a0026651 
Blader, S. L., & Rothman, N. B. (2014). Paving the road to preferential treatment with good 
intentions: Empathy, accountability and fairness. Journal of Experimental Social 




Blader, S. L., Wiesenfeld, B. M., Rothman, N. B., & Wheeler-Smith, S. L. (2010). Social 
emotions and justice: How the emotional fabric of groups determines justice enactment and 
reactions. Research on Managing Groups and Teams, 13, 29–63. 
Borman, W. C., & Brush, D. H. (1993). More progress toward a taxonomy of managerial 
performance requirements. Human Performance, 6(1), 1–21. 
doi:10.1207/s15327043hup0601_1 
Bowen, D. E., & Ostroff, C. (2004). Understanding HRM-firm performance linkages: The role of 
the “strength” of the HRM system. Academy of Management Review, 29(2), 203–221. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.2004.12736076 
Brockner, J. (2006). Why it’s so hard to be fair. Harvard Business Review, 84(3), 122–130. 
Brockner, J. (2010). A contemporary look at organizational justice: Multiplying insult times 
injury. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Brockner, J., Wiesenfeld, B. M., & Diekmann, K. A. (2009). Towards a “fairer” conception of 
process fairness: Why, when and how more may not always be better than less. Academy of 
Management Annals, 3(1), 183–216. doi:10.1080/19416520903047228 
Brockner, J., Wiesenfeld, B. M., Siegel, P. A., Bobocel, D. R., & Liu, Z. (2015). Riding the fifth 
wave: Organizational justice as dependent variable. Research in Organizational Behavior, 
35, 103–121. doi:10.1016/j.riob.2015.07.002 
Campbell, M., Bates, J. I., Marin, A., & Meddings, K. (2007). The stress of leadership. Center 
for Creative Leadership. 
Carlson, K. D., & Wu, J. (2012). The illusion of statistical control: Control variable practice in 





Chen, G., Gully, S. M., Whiteman, J.-A., & Kilcullen, R. N. (2000). Examination of 
relationships among trait-like individual differences, state-like individual differences, and 
learning performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(6), 835–847. 
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. E. (2001). The role of justice in organizations: A meta-
analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86(2), 278–321. 
doi:10.1006/obhd.2001.2958 
Cole, N. D., & Latham, G. P. (1997). Effects of training in procedural justice on perceptions of 
disciplinary fairness by unionized employees and disciplinary subject matter experts. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 82(5), 699–705. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.82.5.699 
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of 
a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 386–400. doi:10.1037//0021-
9010.86.3.386 
Colquitt, J. A., & Greenberg, J. (2003). Organizational justice: A fair assessment of the state of 
the literature. In J. Greenberg (Ed.), Organizational behavior: The state of the science (2nd 
ed., pp. 159–200). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Colquitt, J. A., Long, D. M., Rodell, J. B., & Halvorsen-Ganepola, M. D. K. (2015). Adding the 
“in” to justice: A qualitative and quantitative investigation of the differential effects of 
justice rule adherence and violation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(2), 278–297. 
doi:10.1037/a0038131 
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., Rodell, J. B., Long, D. M., Zapata, C. P., Conlon, D. E., & Wesson, 




exchange and affect-based perspectives. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(2), 199–236. 
doi:10.1037/a0031757 
Colquitt, J. A., & Shaw, J. D. (2005). How should organizational justice be measured? In J. 
Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), Handbook of organizational justice (pp. 113–152). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Colquitt, J. A., & Zipay, K. P. (2015). Justice, fairness, and employee reactions. Annual Review 
of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 2(1), 75–99. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111457 
Conway, J. M. (1999). Distinguishing contextual performance from task performance for 
managerial jobs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(1), 3–13. doi:10.1037/0021-
9010.84.1.3 
Cooper, C. D., & Scandura, T. A. (2015). Getting to “fair”: Justice interactions as identity 
negotiation. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 22(4), 418–432. 
doi:10.1177/1548051815605021 
Cornelis, I., Van Hiel, A., De Cremer, D., & Mayer, D. M. (2013). When leaders choose to be 
fair: Follower belongingness needs and leader empathy influences leaders’ adherence to 
procedural fairness rules. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(4), 605–613. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.02.016 
Courtright, S. H., Colbert, A. E., & Choi, D. (2014). Fired up or burned out? How developmental 
challenge differentially impacts leader behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 99(4), 
681–696. doi:10.1037/a0035790 




Justice rules and fairness judgments. Research in Personnel and Human Resources 
Management, 33, 279–350. 
Danziger, S., Levav, J., & Avnaim-Pesso, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(17), 
6889–6892. doi:10.1073/pnas.1018033108 
Decoster, S., Stouten, J., Camps, J., & Tripp, T. M. (2014). The role of employees’ OCB and 
leaders' hindrance stress in the emergence of self-serving leadership. Leadership Quarterly, 
25(4), 647–659. doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.02.005 
DeShon, R. P., & Gillespie, J. Z. (2005). A motivated action theory account of goal orientation. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(6), 1096–1127. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.6.1096 
DeShon, R. P., Kozlowski, S. W. J., Schmidt, A. M., Milner, K. R., & Wiechmann, D. (2004). A 
multiple-goal, multilevel model of feedback effects on the regulation of individual and team 
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(6), 1035–1056. doi:10.1037/0021-
9010.89.6.1035 
Emsley, D. (2003). Multiple goals and managers’ job-related tension and performance. Journal 
of Managerial Psychology, 18(4), 345–356. doi:10.1108/02683940310473091 
Facteau, C. L., Facteau, J. D., Schoel, L. C., Russell, J. E. A., & Poteet, M. L. (1998). Reactions 
of leaders to 360-degree feedback from subordinates and peers. Leadership Quarterly, 9(4), 
427–448. 
Fassina, N. E., Jones, D. A., & Uggerslev, K. L. (2008). Meta-analytic tests of relationships 
between organizational justice and citizenship behavior: Testing agent-system and shared-




Folger, R., & Skarlicki, D. P. (1998). When tough times make tough bosses: Managerial 
distancing as a function of layoff blame. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 79–87. 
doi:10.2307/256899 
Frost, P., & Robinson, S. (1999). The toxic handler: Organizational hero--and casualty. Harvard 
Business Review, 77(4), 96–106. doi:10.1086/250095 
Gallup. (2015). State of the american manager: Analytics ad advice for leaders. 
Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., Mead, N. L., & Ariely, D. (2011). Unable to resist temptation: How 
self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 115(2), 191–203. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.03.001 
Grant, A. M., & Mayer, D. M. (2009). Good soldiers and good actors: Prosocial and impression 
management motives as interactive predictors of affiliative citizenship behaviors. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 94(4), 900–912. doi:10.1037/a0013770 
Grant, A. M., Molinsky, A., Margolis, J., Kamin, M., & Schiano, W. (2009). The performer’s 
reactions to procedural injustice: When prosocial identity reduces prosocial behavior. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39(2), 319–349. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2008.00440.x 
Greenberg, J. (1988). Cultivating an image of justice: Looking fair on the job. Academy of 
Management Executive, 2(2), 155–157. 
Greenberg, J. (1990a). Looking fair vs. being fair-managing impressions of organizational 
justice. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 111–157. 
Greenberg, J. (1990b). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today and tomorrow. Journal of 




Greenberg, J., & Eskew, D. E. (1993). The role of role playing in organizational research. 
Journal of Management, 19(2), 221–241. 
Hambrick, D. C., Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A. C. (2005). Executive job demands: New insights 
for explaining strategic decisions and leader behaviors. Academy of Management Review, 
30(3), 472–491. doi:10.5465/AMR.2005.17293355 
Heslin, P. A., & VandeWalle, D. (2009). Performance appraisal procedural justice: The role of a 
manager’s implicit person theory. Journal of Management, 37(6), 1694–1718. 
doi:10.1177/0149206309342895 
Hobfoll, S. E., & Shirom, A. (2001). Conservation of resources theory: Applications to stress and 
management in the workplace. In R. T. Golembiewski (Ed.), Handbook of Organizational 
Behavior (2nd ed., pp. 57–80). New York, NY: Marcel Dekker. 
Hockey, G. R. J. (1997). Compensatory control in the regulation of human performance under 
stress and high workload: A cognitive energetical framework. Biological Psychology, 
45(96), 73–93. doi:10.1016/S0301-0511(96)05223-4 
Holmström, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multi-task principal-agent analysis: Incentive contract, 
asset ownership and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(1991), 24–
52. doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special 
Hoogervorst, N., De Cremer, D., & van Dijke, M. (2013). When do leaders grant voice? How 
leaders’ perceptions of followers' control and belongingness needs affect the enactment of 
fair procedures. Human Relations, 66(7), 973–992. doi:10.1177/0018726713482150 
House, R. J. (1996). Path-goal theory of leadership: Lessons, legacy, and a reformulated theory. 




Howell, D. C. (2007). Statistical Methods for Psychology (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
Huang, J. L., Bowling, N. A., Liu, M., & Li, Y. (2014). Detecting insufficient effort responding 
with an infrequency scale: Evaluating validity and participant reactions. Journal of Business 
and Psychology. doi:10.1007/s10869-014-9357-6 
Huang, J. L., Liu, M., & Bowling, N. A. (2014). Insufficient effort responding: Examining an 
insidious confound in survey data. Journal of Applied Psychology. 
Ilies, R., Dimotakis, N., & De Pater, I. E. (2010). Psychological and physiological reactions to 
high workloads: Implications for well-being. Personnel Psychology, 63(2), 407–436. 
doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2010.01175.x 
Ilies, R., Huth, M., Ryan, A. M., & Dimotakis, N. (2015). Explaining the links between 
workload, distress, and work–family conflict among school employees: Physical, cognitive, 
and emotional fatigue. Journal of Educational Psychology, 107(4), 1136–1149. 
doi:10.1037/edu0000029 
Janssen, O. (2001). Fairness perceptions as a moderator in the curvilinear relationships between 
job demands, and job performance and job satisfaction. Academy of Management Journal, 
44(5), 1039–1050. doi:10.2307/3069447 
Jazayeri, M., & Scapens, R. W. (2008). The business values scorecard within BAE Systems: The 
evolution of a performance measurement system. British Accounting Review, 40(1), 48–70. 
doi:10.1016/j.bar.2007.10.007 
Johnson, R. E., Lanaj, K., & Barnes, C. M. (2014). The good and bad of being fair: effects of 




Psychology, 99(4), 635–650. doi:10.1037/a0035647 
Judge, T. A., & Piccolo, R. F. (2004). Transformational and transactional leadership: a meta-
analytic test of their relative validity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(5), 755–68. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.5.755 
Kanfer, R., & Ackerman, P. L. (1989). Motivation and cognitive abilities: An 
integrative/aptitude-treatment interaction approach to skill acquisition. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 74(4), 657–690. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.74.4.657 
Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1996). Using the balanced management system. Harvard 
Business Review, 74(1), 75–86. 
Katz, D., & Khan, R. L. (1978). The social psychology of organizations (2nd ed.). New York, 
NY: Wiley. 
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management 
Journal, 18(4), 769–783. doi:10.1109/EMR.1978.4306645 
Kinicki, A. J., & Vecchio, R. P. (1994). Influences on the quality of supervisor–subordinate 
relations: The role of time-pressure, organizational commitment, and locus of control. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 15(1), 75–82. doi:10.1002/job.4030150108 
Korsgaard, M. A., Roberson, L., & Rymph, R. D. (1998). What motivates fairness? The role of 
subordinate assertive behavior on managers’ interactional fairness. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 83(5), 731–744. 
Kreft, I., & De Leeuw, J. (1998). Introducing multilevel modeling. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Woo Young Chun, & Sleeth-




experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 331–378). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(02)80008-9 
Landis, R. S., Beal, D. J., & Tesluk, P. E. (2000). A comparison of approaches to forming 
composite measures in structural equation models. Organizational Research Methods, 3(2), 
186–207. doi:10.1177/109442810032003 
Latham, G. P. (2001). The importance of understanding and changing employee outcome 
expectancies for gaining commitment to an organizational goal. Personnel Psychology, 
54(3), 707–716. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2001.tb00229.x 
Lee, R. T., & Ashforth, B. E. (1996). A meta-analytic examination of the correlates of the three 
dimensions of job burnout. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(2), 123–133. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.81.2.123 
LePine, J. A., Podsakoff, N. P., & LePine, M. A. (2005). A meta-analytic test of the challenge 
stressor-hindrance stressor framework: An explanation for inconsistent relationships among 
stressors and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 48(5), 764–775. 
doi:10.5465/AMJ.2005.18803921 
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological 
Bulletin, 125(2), 255–275. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study 
of fairness in social relationships. In K. Gergen, M. Greenberg, & R. Willis (Eds.), Social 
exchange: Advances in theory and research. New York, NY: Plenum Press. 
Liao, H., Toya, K., Lepak, D. P., & Hong, Y. (2009). Do they see eye to eye? Management and 




service quality. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(2), 371–91. doi:10.1037/a0013504 
Lovelace, K. J., Manz, C. C., & Alves, J. C. (2007). Work stress and leadership development: 
The role of self-leadership, shared leadership, physical fitness and flow in managing 
demands and increasing job control. Human Resource Management Review, 17(4), 374–
387. doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2007.08.001 
Macan, T. H. (1994). Time management: Test of a process model. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 79(3), 381–391. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.79.3.381 
Margolis, J. D., & Molinsky, A. (2008). Navigating the bind of necessary evils: Psychological 
engagement and the production of interpersonally sensitive behavior. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(5), 847–872. 
Mawritz, M. B., Folger, R., & Latham, G. P. (2014). Supervisors’ exceedingly difficult goals and 
abusive supervision: The mediating effects of hindrance stress, anger, and anxiety. Journal 
of Organizational Behavior, 35(3), 358–372. doi:10.1002/job.1879 
Mayer, D., Nishii, L., Schneider, B., & Goldstein, H. (2007). The precursors and products of 
justice climates: Group leader antecedents and employee attitudinal consequences. 
Personnel Psychology, 60(4), 929–963. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.2007.00096.x 
Meindl, J. R. (1989). Managing to be fair: An exploration of values, motives, and leadership. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(2), 252–276. doi:10.2307/2989898 
Mintzberg, H. (1973). The nature of managerial work. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Mitchell, M. S., Vogel, R. M., & Folger, R. (2015). Third parties’ reactions to the abusive 





Motowidlo, S. J., & Van Scotter, J. R. (1994). Evidence that task performance should be 
distinguished from contextual performance. Journal of Applied Psychology. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.79.4.475 
Mueller, J. S., & Kamdar, D. (2011). Why seeking help from teammates is a blessing and a 
curse: A theory of help seeking and individual creativity in team contexts. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 96(2), 263–276. doi:10.1037/a0021574 
Muraven, M., Gagné, M., & Rosman, H. (2008). Helpful self-control: Autonomy support, 
vitality, and depletion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), 573–585. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.008 
Nicklin, J. M., McNall, L. A., Cerasoli, C. P., Strahan, S. R., & Cavanaugh, J. A. (2014). The 
role of overall organizational justice perceptions within the four-dimensional framework. 
Social Justice Research, 27(2), 243–270. doi:10.1007/s11211-014-0208-4 
Northcraft, G. B., Schmidt, A. M., & Ashford, S. J. (2011). Feedback and the rationing of time 
and effort among competing tasks. Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(5), 1076–1086. 
doi:10.1037/a0023221 
Ocasio, W. (1997). Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
18(S1), 187–206. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199707)18:1+<187::AID-
SMJ936>3.3.CO;2-B 
Oh, I.-S., & Berry, C. M. (2009). The five-factor model of personality and managerial 
performance: Validity gains through the use of 360 degree performance ratings. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 94(6), 1498–1513. doi:10.1037/a0017221 




wild: The systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23(1), 6–16. doi:10.5465/AMP.2009.37007999 
Parasuraman, A., Berry, L. L., & Zeithaml, V. A. (1991). Refinement and reassessment of the 
SERQUAL scale. Journal of Retailing, 67(4), 420–450. 
Patient, D. L., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2010). Increasing interpersonal and informational justice when 
communicating negative news: The role of the manager’s empathic concern and moral 
development. Journal of Management, 36(2), 555–578. doi:10.1177/0149206308328509 
Pedhazur, E. J., & Pedhazur Schmelkin, L. (1991). Measurement, design, and analysis: An 
integrated approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Pepper, A., Gosling, T., & Gore, J. (2015). Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: Building equity 
considerations into agency theory. Human Relations , 68 (8 ), 1291–1314. 
doi:10.1177/0018726714554663 
Pillutla, M., Law, K. S., & Lee, C. (1997). Why does the fairness of procedures matter: A test of 
three models. In Paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference. 
Pohler, D., & Schmidt, J. A. (2015). Does pay-for-performance strain the employment 
relationship? The effect of manager bonus eligibility on nonmanagement employee 
turnover. Personnel Psychology. doi:10.1111/peps.12106 
Quinn, R. W., Spreitzer, G. M., & Lam, C. F. (2012). Building a sustainable model of human 
energy in organizations: Exploring the critical role of resources. Academy of Management 
Annals, 6, 337–396. doi:10.1080/19416520.2012.676762 
Rapp, A. A., Bachrach, D. G., & Rapp, T. L. (2013). The influence of time management skill on 




performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(4), 668–677. doi:10.1037/a0031733 
Resource. (2015). Retrieved January 1, 2015, from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/resource 
Richter, M., König, C. J., Koppermann, C., & Schilling, M. (2016). Displaying fairness while 
delivering bad news: Testing the effectiveness of organizational bad news training in the 
layoff context. Journal of Applied Psychology. doi:10.1037/apl0000087 
Roberson, Q. M., & Williamson, I. O. (2012). Justice in self-managing teams: The role of social 
networks in the emergence of procedural justice climates. Academy of Management 
Journal, 55(3), 685–701. doi:10.5465/amj.2009.0491 
Rothman, N. B., Wheeler-Smith, S. L., Wiesenfeld, B. M., & Galinsky, A. D. (2015). Gaining 
power but losing status: Why unfair leaders are selected over fair leaders. 
Rupp, D. E., & Cropanzano, R. (2002). The mediating effects of social exchange relationships in 
predicting workplace outcomes from multifoci organizational justice. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89(1), 925–946. 
Rupp, D. E., Shao, R., Jones, K. S., & Liao, H. (2014). The utility of a multifoci approach to the 
study of organizational justice: A meta-analytic investigation into the consideration of 
normative rules, moral accountability, bandwidth-fidelity, and social exchange. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 159–185. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.10.011 
Ryan, R. M., Koestner, R., & Deci, E. L. (1991). Ego-involved persistence: When free-choice 





Schmidt, A. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2007). What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, 
and time on dynamic goal prioritization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 928–941. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.928 
Schmidt, A. M., & Dolis, C. M. (2009). Something’s got to give: The effects of dual-goal 
difficulty, goal progress, and expectancies on resource allocation. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 94(3), 678–691. doi:10.1037/a0014945 
Schminke, M., Ambrose, M. L., & Cropanzano, R. S. (2000). The effect of organizational 
structure on perceptions of procedural fairness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(2), 294–
304. doi:10.1037//0021-9010.85.2.294 
Schminke, M., Cropanzano, R., & Rupp, D. E. (2002). Organization structure and fairness 
perceptions: The moderating effects of organizational level. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 89(1), 881–905. doi:10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00034-1 
Scott, B. A., Colquitt, J. A., & Paddock, E. L. (2009). An actor-focused model of justice rule 
adherence and violation: The role of managerial motives and discretion. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 94(3), 756–769. doi:10.1037/a0015712 
Scott, B. A., Colquitt, J. A., & Zapata-Phelan, C. P. (2007). Justice as a dependent variable: 
subordinate charisma as a predictor of interpersonal and informational justice perceptions. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(6), 1597–609. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1597 
Scott, B. A., Garza, A. S., Conlon, D. E., & Kim, Y. J. (2014). Why do managers act fairly in the 
first place? A daily investigation of “Hot” and “Cold” motives and discretion. Academy of 
Management Journal, 57(6), 1571–1591. doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0644 




feedback facilitator on the influence behavior of managers toward subordinates. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 88(3), 561–569. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.3.561 
Selig, J. P., & Preacher, K. J. (2008). Monte Carlo method for assessing mediation: An 
interactive tool for creating confidence intervals for indirect effects. http://quantpsy.org/. 
Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: On the antecedents 
and consequences of goal shielding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 
1261–1280. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1261 
Shao, R., Rupp, D. E., Skarlicki, D. P., & Jones, K. S. (2013). Employee justice across cultures: 
A meta-analytic review. Journal of Management, 39(1), 263–301. 
doi:10.1177/0149206311422447 
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to fit multilevel models, hierarchical models, 
and individual growth models. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 23(4), 
323–355. doi:10.3102/10769986023004323 
Smither, J. W., & Walker, A. G. (2004). Are the characteristics of narrative comments related to 
improvement in multirater feedback ratings over time? Journal of Applied Psychology, 
89(3), 575–581. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.3.575 
Spector, P. E., & Jex, S. M. (1998). Development of four self-report measures of job stressors 
and strain: Interpersonal conflict at work scale, organizational constraints scale, quantitative 
workload inventory, and physical symptoms inventory. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, 3(4), 356–367. doi:10.1037/1076-8998.3.4.356 
Spreitzer, G. M. (1995). Psychological empowerment in the workplace: Dimensions, 





Unsworth, K., Yeo, G., & Beck, J. (2014). Multiple goals: A review and derivation of general 
principles. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 35(8), 1064–1078. doi:10.1002/job.1963 
Van Yperen, N. W., & Hagedoorn, M. (2003). Do high job demands increase intrinsic 
motivation or job strain or both? The role of job control and social support. Academy of 
Management Journal, 46(3), 339–348. doi:10.2307/30040627 
Vermunt, R. (2014). Doing good to self and others: Some ideas about the antecedents, processes, 
and consequences of fair resource allocation. Social Justice Research, 27(4), 504–517. 
doi:10.1007/s11211-014-0224-4 
Walsh, J. P. (1995). Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes from a trip down memory 
lane. Organization Science, 6(3), 280–321. doi:10.1287/orsc.6.3.280 
Welbourne, T. M., Johnson, D. E., & Amir, E. (1998). The role-based performance scale: 
Validity analysis of a theory-based measure. Academy of Management Journal, 41(5), 540–
556. 
Whiting, S. W., Podsakoff, P. M., & Pierce, J. R. (2008). Effects of task performance, helping, 
voice, and organizational loyalty on performance appraisal ratings. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 93(1), 125–139. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.1.125 
Wright, P. M., George, J. M., Farnsworth, S. R., & McMahan, G. C. (1993). Productivity and 
extra-role behavior: The effects of goals and incentives on spontaneous helping. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 78(3), 374–381. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.78.3.374 
Yukl, G. (2008). How leaders influence organizational effectiveness. Leadership Quarterly, 




Yukl, G. (2012). Effective leadership behaviors: What we know and what questions need more 
attention? Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(4), 66–85. 
doi:10.5465/amp.2012.0088 
Zapata, C. P., Olsen, J. E., & Martins, L. L. (2013). Social exchange from the supervisor’s 
perspective: Employee trustworthiness as a predictor of interpersonal and informational 
justice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 121(1), 1–12. 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.001 
Zhang, Y., Lepine, J. A., Buckman, B. R., & Wei, F. (2014). It’s not fair... or is it? The role of 
justice and leadership in explaining work stressor-job performance relationships. Academy 
of Management Journal, 57(3), 675–697. doi:10.5465/amj.2011.1110 
Zhao, G., Chen, Y.-R., & Brockner, J. (2015). What influences managers’ procedural fairness 
towards their subordinates? The role of subordinates' trustworthiness. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 59, 96–112. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.04.002 
